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Identification of Trade Secret Claims in Litiga-
tion: 
Solutions for a Ubiquitous Dispute 
By Charles Tait Graves and Brian D. Range *
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Trade secret cases pose special problems distinct from other intellectual 
property lawsuits because alleged trade secrets are rarely defined in advance of litigation.  
For every patent, registered copyright, or trademark, there is a document filed with the 
federal government identifying the details and boundaries of the asserted intellectual 
property.  But in trade secret cases, the plaintiff’s attorneys typically develop the trade 
secret claims at the same time that they file a misappropriation suit against a former 
employee or business partner – or afterwards. 
¶2 Trade secret plaintiffs rarely provide a precise and complete identification of 
the alleged trade secrets at issue without a court order requiring them to do so.  This is a 
strategy, not an accident.  The tactical advantages a plaintiff gains from non-identification 
are too tempting for a plaintiff to voluntarily provide such identification.  In a typical 
case, the plaintiff has filed suit against a recently departed employee who joined or 
started a competing business, and then provide little more than a list of high-level, 
generic categories in which its alleged secrets are said to reside. 
¶3 It is also common for a trade secret plaintiff to alter its list of trade secret 
claims as the case proceeds – sometimes dramatically, by replacing entire categories of 
information or technology, or by re-combining slippery, multi-element “combination 
trade secret” claims into new subsets.  In a 2006 New Jersey case, for example, the 
plaintiff first identified four alleged secrets in an initial interrogatory response, then 
added six, later added thirty-nine in an expert report, then claimed ninety-two in a 
supplemental interrogatory response, and had its expert give what the court called 
“moving target” testimony about the alleged secrets.1  We have seen many similar 
alterations during the course of cases in several jurisdictions, and defendants sometimes 
                                                 
* Charles Tait Graves and Brian D. Range are associates at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in San 
ently 
pportunity 
Francisco, California and Austin, Texas.  This article is the fourth in a series that seeks to clarify frequ
litigated but obscure areas of trade secret law, in the interest of protecting employee mobility and the right 
to use information in the public domain. 
1 See, e.g., Civil Action No. 01-4677 (SRC) 2006 WL 1344084, at *1-3 (D.N.J. May 16, 2006) 
(acknowledging plaintiff’s “moving target” allegations but holding that defense had sufficient o
to take discovery on shifting claims); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Richards Mfg. Co., No. Civ. 01-4677, 2006 
WL 902148, at *8-9 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2006) (barring some expert testimony). 
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 differently, the parties and the court 
cannot accu
¶5 f’s 





ines invites trade secret plaintiffs to avoid identifying their alleged 
secrets in de t 
¶6 
st treatises refer to 
the problem in only general terms,4 and a handful of practitioner-oriented articles note 
5
hs disproving one set of allegations only to face a new, replacement set as th
close of discovery nears.  
Precise identification of the alleged trade secrets is a crucial component of 
trade secret litigation.  This is especially true when complex technology is at issue, b
also in cases featuring simpler claims.  Without a precise identification of software code 
elements, hardware architecture components, or even the names of allegedly secret 
customers, the defendant cannot compare the claims against public domain information to 
challenge the alleged secrecy of such information.  It is difficult to conduct a public 
domain analysis if the claims are identified at only a generic level such as “source c
“ASIC design elements,” or “customer lists.”  Stated
rately decide the question of whether a trade secret exists without first 
understanding what precisely is asserted as a secret. 
It is not surprising, then, that disputes over identification of the plaintif
alleged trade secrets are common.  However, it is notable that courts nationwide have not 
yet articulated a set of guidelines and standards to assist judges who must rule on 
identification questions.  Indeed, courts in various jurisdictions have issued ruling
same identification issues with almost opposite results – a majority requiring more 
identification, but a minority allowing the plaintiff to proceed with only general, 
conclusory descriptions of the alleged trade secrets.  The published rulings indicate that 
courts subjectively reach their own conclusions, often with little or no reference to o
published decisions.  The problem is further exacerbated because courts rarely, if ev
quote precise descriptions of potentially valuable trade secrets in publicly available
opinions, and thus most published opinions do not clarify the degree of specificity 
required.2  As a result, the scattered case law in this area does not always serve as 
precedent, and it is difficult for parties to predict the result in any given case.  The lack 
a uniform set of guidel
tail, because there is always a fair chance that the reviewing court will no
require them to do so. 
Despite the frequency of disputes over the identification of alleged trade 
secrets, the issue has received little scholarly attention.3  Perhaps this is because the case 
law is scattered across multiple jurisdictions, in state and federal courts, without any 
unifying doctrine apart from citations to a few well-known cases.  Mo
particular cases without a nationwide survey or detailed proposals.    
                                                 
2 See Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., No. Civ. A. 00C-10-149JRS, 2004 WL 1965869, at *6-7 (Del. Super`. C
Aug. 16, 2004) (redacting alleged trade secrets). 
t. 




3 The single full-length article we have found devoted to the identification question is Kevin R. Casey, 
Identification of Trade Secrets During Discovery: Timing and Specificity, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 281 (1996) 
(summarizing case law and noting different stages of the case, but apparently recommending that “precise” 
detail need not be disclosed until trial; no specif
We disagree that identification should be withheld until trial, for reasons discussed below.  The majority of 
the case law since 1996 supports our position.  
4 See, e.g., RUDOLF CALLMANN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIE
14:30 (4th ed. Supp. 2006) (briefly noting issue with citations); MELVIN A. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW
5:32, 9:8 (West 2006) (1985) (general description of some identification cases); ROGER M. MILGRIM
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 15.01[1][d][i], 16.01[5][b] (Matthew Bender 2006) (1967) (general 
summary of issue and its importance with a few citations); ROBERT I. WEIL & IRA A. BROWN, JR., 
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:  CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 8:58 (2006) (general description of 





                                                                                                                                                
¶7 Given that most of the identification disputes on record have occurred in the 
past decade, the time is right for a detailed analysis of the identification problem.  We 
believe that courts nationwide facing trade secret disputes should apply a recognized set 
of guidelines and standards to resolve disputes over the identification of alleged trade 
secrets in litigation.  This would reduce unpredictable and inconsistent rulings, deter 
plaintiffs from strategically withholding information by gambling that any given court 
will not require a precise identification, and deter defendants from making the wrong 
demands as to identification at the wrong stage of the case.  We believe that a proper 
standard would take into account the type of information being alleged as secret, the 
stage of the case, and the defendant’s own diligence in raising the issue.   
¶8 To that end, we have reviewed substantially all of the trade secret 
identification rulings available, including unpublished rulings and slip opinions, in order 
to paint a picture of how courts are reacting to similar arguments and disputes across the 
country.  We will describe both outlier and mainstream opinions to illustrate why a set of 
common standards is needed.6  
¶9 Yet merely summarizing holdings does not provide sufficient information to 
propose guidelines.  Few courts have attempted to state rules of general applicability 
beyond the dispute at issue.  Outlining the policy grounds supporting detailed 
identification of trade secret claims is therefore necessary.  We will organize the 
discussion by the stage of the case, the type of information at issue, and the skill with 
which the defense has properly raised the issue.  We will also offer solutions that courts 
can apply for the specific types of alleged secrets at issue in a given case. 
¶10 In short, we offer five proposals as a standard for identification of alleged secrets in 
litigation: 
 
California’s Code Civ. Proc. sec. 2019.210).  The most detailed existing commentary on the identification 
question is JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 11.02 (Supp. 2005).  However, we respectfully disagree with 
the view expressed there that courts should not always require precise identification, especially during the 
discovery stage, because without precision the plaintiff has too easy an opportunity to continually alter its 
claims, and because plaintiffs who file multi-million dollar technology lawsuits are fully capable of 
providing such precision.  Moreover, we have seen many cases where highly technical details were located 
in the public domain, and such research would have been impossible absent precision. 
5 See, e.g., JOHN F. HORNICK & MARGARET A. ESQUENET, TRADE SECRET IDENTIFICATION OF TIMING IN 
DISCOVERY (2005), http://www.finnegan.com/publications/news-popup.cfm?id=1248&type=article (focusing 
on jurisdictions with pre-discovery requirements); Brent Caslin, Secret Weapon: Understanding What 
Constitutes “Reasonable Particularity” Can Be the Decisive Element in Trade Secret Litigation, L.A. 
LAW., Apr. 2004, at 44 (noting leading cases and advising defendants about various motions to file 
regarding an insufficient identification); York M. Faulkner & Margeret A Esquenet, Putting an End to the 
Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Game of Bait and Switch, IP LITIGATOR, Sept. 2001, at 24-25 (noting problem and 
describing a few leading cases); Randy Kay, Identifying Trade Secrets in Litigation - Managing the 
Process, 28 NEW MATTER 1/2, Sept. 2003, 19-22 (noting problem and providing advice for plaintiffs and 
defendants); James R. Mckown, Discovery of Trade Secrets, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 35, 47 (1994) (noting leading cases on identification disputes as of 1994 in article about procedural 
aspects of disclosing trade secrets in various litigation contexts); David R. Sugden, C.C.P. Section 
2019.210: A Sword, Not a Shield, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Mar. 2006, at 51-55 (advising defense counsel 
to take advantage of California’s pre-discovery identification statute and use a plaintiff’s failure to identify 
to move for summary judgment later in the case). 
6 Of course, rulings on most identification disputes take place on discovery calendars in trial courts and 
thus are never published, so a complete nationwide survey is not possible.   
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(1) Courts should first separate the question of whether the plaintiff has identi-
fied an alleged secret from the question of whether the information is, in fact, 
a trade secret; 
(2) Courts should require a reasonably detailed identification of the alleged se-
crets before a plaintiff can proceed with discovery – a rule already required 
by statute in California, and by common law in several other states; 
(3) Perhaps most importantly, if a defendant properly requests a precise identifi-
cation during discovery, the court should require a precise, complete identifi-
cation of whatever type of information is at issue – including an identification 
of alleged “combination trade secrets”; 
(4) No trade secret plaintiff should obtain an injunction or avoid summary judg-
ment without a precise identification of alleged secrets; 
(5) Trade secret plaintiffs should not be permitted to alter or amend an identifica-
tion of trade secret claims without a showing of good cause. 
¶11 These standards would remove the uncertainty that prevails in identification 
disputes.  A trade secret plaintiff with a valid claim would have incentive to identify the 
alleged secrets early on, and a defendant who has misappropriated trade secrets could 
more easily be shown to have done so.  A trade secret plaintiff with a meritless claim, 
however, would more easily be exposed.  These standards would make it more difficult to 
sue former employees for harassment purposes and to spend them into the ground with 
protracted litigation, and more difficult to claim public domain information as trade 
secrets.  
¶12 We believe that these proposals are equally applicable in jurisdictions which 
have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and those which follow the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts.  Under both, a plaintiff must establish that the information at issue 
does, in fact, constitute trade secrets.7  Requiring identification is a necessary case 
management tool to ensure that the parties and the court accurately understand what 
information is being asserted as secret in order to proceed to the secrecy question.8 
¶13 This Article is primarily for courts ruling on identification questions, who 
must research the issue when parties file pleadings that cite only decisions that favor their 
positions, and who may need a single source for all of the nationwide case law.  We 
believe that courts do not always realize the degree to which the identification of trade 
 
7 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West 2006) (California Uniform Trade Secrets Act provision 
defining trade secrecy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1979) (Restatement definition of 
trade secrecy).  
8 We note, however, that identification may not always matter in jurisdictions where a former employer can 
use contract law to bind former employees with non-competition covenants that bar use of non-secret 
material for some period after resignation.  See, e.g., Lason Serv., Inc. v. Rathe, No. Civ.A.3:02CV2110-D, 
2003 WL 21728184, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2003) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff failed to 
identify allegedly secret customers because non-solicitation covenant barring solicitation of customers was 
valid in jurisdiction and it was rrelevant whether customers were secret or non-secret); Paper Mfg. Co. v. 
Weiss, No. 1040, 1972 WL 15994, at *3 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 13, 1972) (denying motion to require 
identification of alleged trade secrets given that plaintiff’s claim was premised on restrictive non-
competition contract valid in that jurisdiction, and thus plaintiff need not prove trade secrets to prevail). 





                                                
secret claims is a lawyers’ game, where one side holds back information and hopes that 
the opposing party will fail to raise the issue, or hopes that that a court will accept the 
argument that generic references to complex technology are sufficient.   
¶14 This Article should also be of use to litigants, both to plaintiffs who have 
valid claims and seek to identify them in good faith and to defendants who lack the time 
or money to canvass the vast jurisprudence on identification, or who want to craft the best 
possible discovery requests to pin down a trade secret plaintiff and force a precise 
identification.   
¶15 In what follows, we will describe the common mistakes that courts make 
when ruling on identification disputes, the problems that arise in the absence of a precise 
identification of trade secret claims, and how courts nationwide have ruled on 
identification disputes.  We will then offer specific proposals for resolving identification 
questions. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
¶16 A trade secret case usually begins shortly after a former employee has 
resigned and either joined a competitor or formed a new, competing business.  The 
plaintiff files a lawsuit that accuses the defendant of misappropriating trade secrets, but 
the complaint contains only generalities about the nature of the alleged secrets.  Once the 
parties have entered into a protective order that allows the confidential sharing of 
information between the parties and their attorneys,9 the plaintiff sometimes issues a 
written statement that purports to identify the trade secret claims at issue, and sometimes 
provides such a statement as a discovery response.  Because the statement rarely if ever 
identifies the alleged secrets with precision, a dispute over the specificity of the 
identification often arises within the first three months of the litigation.  In other cases, 
the identification dispute arises later, when the plaintiff alters its claims or raises a new 
set of claims. 
¶17 In the typical dispute over identification of alleged trade secrets, the defense 
argues that the plaintiff’s list of categories and concepts is not specific enough, and then 
cites a scattering of cases that may not have been decided at the same stage of the case, 
that may not have addressed the same type of information, or that provided no real 
guidance on how much precision was required.  The plaintiff, in turn, often responds by 
arguing that the defendant already knows what the alleged trade secrets are because the 
defendant knows what it stole, and thus no identification is necessary.  The plaintiff will 
typically argue that a list of high-level concepts is sufficient and make selective citations 
to cases so holding, and it may also argue that because it alleges “combination” trade 
 
9 A protective order in a trade secret case usually creates a three-tier classification for information produced 
in discovery:  material that is designated as non-confidential, material that is designated such that only the 
parties can view it and not the public, and material that only the attorneys and expert witnesses can view.  
The parties usually agree on terms allowing the individuals actually accused of misappropriating trade 
secrets to see the list of items they are accused of having stolen.  In most cases, employees of the parties 
rarely see documents and other information produced by the other party, so there is little if any risk that one 
side will misuse information produced by the other. 
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secrets rather than individual trade secrets, no identification should be required.10  Also, if 
the case is at an early stage, the plaintiff may argue that it cannot yet know every trade 
secret that was stolen and therefore cannot identify all trade secrets claims it may assert 
in the future. 
¶18 Assessing an identification dispute can be difficult given the lack of 
uniformity in the published cases and the absence of a set of standards to which courts 
can look, especially in jurisdictions where trade secret lawsuits are less common. 
A. Twelve Policy Considerations Relating to Vague Trade Secret Allegations 
¶19 The best place to begin is to step back from the facts of the case at issue and 
outline the policy reasons why requiring a detailed identification of the trade secret 
claims makes sense.  We believe that there are at least twelve such considerations.  
Courts have cited some of these considerations when requiring identification, and we 
have come to recognize the others in the course of litigating scores of trade secret cases. 
¶20 The first consideration is that the identification of an alleged trade secret can 
only come from the plaintiff, because there is no other pre-existing source one can look to 
for the details of the alleged intellectual property.  Trade secrets are not listed claim-by-
claim like patents or set forth in their entirety like registered copyrights or trademarks.  
There is no public source to which the defendant can look in order to determine what 
potential trade secrets the plaintiff possesses.  The plaintiff’s decision on what to claim as 
its trade secrets in litigation is a subjective one.  Even if a former employee defendant 
could guess what trade secret claims the former employer might make, the specifics of 
the actual claim could differ from that speculation.  On this point, it is important to note 
that the plaintiff’s identification of its own alleged intellectual property does not depend 
on the defendant’s documents, because the preliminary question is whether the plaintiff 
has a trade secret, which must be answered before determining whether the defendant 
used the secret in its products or services. 
¶21 The second consideration is that requiring an early and precise identification 
of alleged trade secrets will encourage compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
11 and similar state rules governing frivolous pleadings.  Such statutes and the Uniform 
Trade Secret Act all require that a trade secret plaintiff make allegations of 
misappropriation in good faith – either directly or through general rules against meritless 
accusations.11  Any plaintiff’s pre-lawsuit review of a potential trade secret matter should 
therefore consider whether the basic elements of the tort claim can be met, such as (1) the 
existence, in fact, of a trade secret; (2) the plaintiff's use of reasonable measures to 
maintain that secrecy; and (3) the defendant's misappropriation of one or more such 
secrets.12  A plaintiff cannot adequately investigate these elements without internally 
identifying the trade secret claims under consideration.  A vague identification of alleged 
trade secrets once the litigation has begun suggests that the plaintiff did not undertake a 
 
10 For a discussion of courts which have accepted this “combination trade secret” argument, see infra 
Section III.A. 
11 For example, California’s version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act provides remedies for bad faith trade 
secret claims, and the state also has a general statute governing frivolous pleadings.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3426.4 (West 2006); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7(b) (West 2006). 
12 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 2006) (definitions of elements of a trade secret claim). 





                                                
pre-lawsuit review.  If parties know that identification will be required early in litigation, 
they have greater incentive to do a careful review before filing suit.   
¶22 Third, and similarly, a lax identification standard could allow a party to avoid 
the statute of limitations.  As one court noted on this point: 
These facts of cutting edge technological life, to say nothing of the limita-
tions of language generally, have the effect of giving the person asserting 
trade secret claims in these kinds of cases, very wide definitional latitude, 
and, with that, considerable power to manipulate the articulation of claims 
for tactical purposes, e.g., to escape what might otherwise be a perfectly 
sensible application of the statute of limitations.13  
¶23 The fourth consideration is that an exact identification is necessary to set the 
proper bounds and scope of discovery – the areas in which discovery will be permitted.  
Litigating parties often make and sell products outside the scope of the alleged trade 
secrets, and requiring a precise identification prevents burdensome and expensive 
discovery into irrelevant areas.  Also, without a detailed identification, a plaintiff may 
later define its alleged secrets by first looking at the defendant’s documents and then 
crafting claims that match those documents, but that do not match the plaintiff’s own 
information. 
¶24 The fifth consideration is that requiring a detailed identification early in a 
lawsuit may reduce future disputes over identification and thereby reduce the length of 
the discovery process.  By contrast, a plaintiff who identifies the claims only later may 
cause new rounds of depositions and other discovery as the parties scramble to assess the 
newly-provided information.  Knowing the claims early allows for a focused and efficient 
discovery plan from the start, and thus serves as a useful case management tool. 
¶25 The sixth consideration is that without a precise identification, the defense 
lacks the information it needs to conduct public domain research and challenge the 
alleged secrecy of the information at issue.  Seventh, and for the same reasons, the 
reviewing court cannot rule on a secrecy claim with accuracy and confidence if the exact 
parameters of the information remain unclear.  Without details, who can be sure that the 
alleged secret has not been published elsewhere, by a market competitor, an engineering 
publication, or in academic work? 
¶26 The eighth consideration is that requiring a precise identification prevents a 
plaintiff from making overbroad secrecy claims encompassing vast categories of 
information.  Plaintiffs sometimes use the trade secret claim as a sort of non-competition 
covenant by listing wide areas of technology that encompass the former employee’s 
entire set of skills, knowledge, and experience.  Ninth, and on a related point, a defendant 
cannot formulate its arguments for differentiating its technology from the alleged trade 
secrets at issue without knowing precisely what those trade secrets are.  For example, a 
former employee may well have worked in good faith to ensure that software written for 
a subsequent employer would not copy or otherwise make use of the former employer’s 
 
13 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 634, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (regarding trade secret statute 
of limitations under California’s UTSA).  
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non-public information, but cannot make that distinction if the plaintiff asserts only 
general functionalities common to that general type of software. 
¶27 The tenth consideration is that expert reports from both sides will be more 
useful and focused if the exact nature of the alleged secrets is known before they begin 
their work.  Without an exact identification, the plaintiff’s expert may simply declare that 
broad areas of technology are trade secrets, without actually conducting specific public 
domain research that could support a valid scientific opinion.  Meanwhile, the defense 
experts may be forced to spend a great deal of effort researching and opining on wider 
areas of technology than are at issue, without being able to focus on the exact technology 
the plaintiff claims as intellectual property. 
¶28 The eleventh consideration is that the trade secret plaintiff should not be able 
to unilaterally alter and amend its claims without judicial review as the lawsuit proceeds.  
Too many trade secret cases feature a kaleidoscope of amorphous, frequently-altered 
claims that prevent the defense from pinning down and defeating any solid set of claims.  
Requiring an early and precise identification of alleged secrets can make attempts at 
unsupervised alteration apparent.  By contrast, a broad and non-specific list of concepts 
and categories allows a plaintiff to alter the details of the claims in a manner more likely 
to escape judicial review. 
¶29 Finally, and perhaps most broadly, requiring a detailed identification protects 
employees’ interests in moving to the jobs of their choice and using public domain 
information, as they have a right to do.  When a plaintiff makes vague trade secret claims 
against a former employee without narrowly defining the actual items at issue, it is 
essentially requesting a court-created non-competition agreement against the defendant.14  
Such claims cut into the former employee’s general right to take non-secret knowledge, 
skills, and experience from job to job.15  But when discovery focuses only on detailed 
clams susceptible to examination and study, there is less risk that these important public 
policy interests will be encroached upon. 
¶30 At the same time, we do not agree with all of the policy grounds that courts 
have given for requiring a detailed identification of alleged trade secrets.  Some courts 
and commentators have asserted that identification is needed to prevent a malicious 
plaintiff from filing suit for the purpose of getting into the defendant’s own information 
and taking the defendant’s trade secrets.16  While we have learned from experience that 
 
14 It should be noted that an employee seeking to act in good faith may have no affirmative ability to obtain 
a specific list of potential trade secrets in order to avoid using them.  In Lane v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 
905 S.W.2d 39, 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), a former employee sought a declaratory judgment that would 
force his former employer to list any trade secrets that it contended the former employee could not utilize in 
his new job.  The court held the issue was not justiciable because the former employee had “not invented, 
and may never invent, anything that is of concern to Baxter.”  Id. at 42.  Thus, the former employee’s 
attempt to use a declaratory judgment action to determine how he could fairly compete with his former 
employer failed.   
15 The concept that former employees are free to use general skills, knowledge, and experience is well 
established. See, e.g., Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 143-144 (9th 
Cir. 1965) (“[plaintiff’s] former employees cannot be denied the right to use their general skill, knowledge 
and experience, even though acquired in part during their employment by [plaintiff]); Eaton Corp. v. 
Appliance Valves Corp., 526 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (“the general knowledge and skill 
obtained by an employee during his employment belongs to that employee and can be utilized by him after 
terminating his employment”), aff’d, 688 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1982). 
16 See, e.g., Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (S.D. Cal. 1999) 





                                                                                                                                                
attorneys are willing to assist their clients by altering claims and by not defining claims, 
we believe that it is less likely that a law firm would assist a client’s scheme to take 
information from a competitor by filing a lawsuit against the competitor and turning over 
information produced in discovery and designated as confidential under a protective 
order.  We believe that courts should avoid relying on this purported basis for requiring 
an identification, and focus instead on the real problems caused by non-identification. 
B. Mistakes Courts Make When Ruling on Identification Questions 
¶31 Reflecting on these policy considerations should assist courts in making a 
ruling appropriate to the case at issue, and in avoiding the mistakes courts sometimes 
make when deciding identification questions. 
¶32 Several such mistakes merit special attention.  To begin with, a tiny minority 
of courts have nullified the identification requirement altogether, refusing to require a 
trade secret plaintiff to identify the trade secret claims even in the face of the defendant’s 
discovery requests or controlling law in the jurisdiction.  As one example, a California 
trial court sanctioned a trade secret defendant in a 2006 case for not providing discovery 
after the plaintiff failed to serve a trade secret identification statement, and it took an 
appeal to reverse the sanctions – even though California has a statute requiring that a 
trade secret plaintiff provide a reasonably particular identification of alleged secrets 
before pursuing discovery.17  In another case, a Massachusetts court repeatedly rejected 
the defendant’s efforts to learn the details of the alleged secrets.18   
¶33 Rulings like these are outliers.  But three other mistakes that courts make are 
more common, and perhaps less obvious.  One is not recognizing that the identification of 
the trade secret claims is a separate issue distinct from whether the information at issue is 
secret, because that identification is a necessary preliminary step leading to the secrecy 
analysis.  In such cases, courts conflate identification questions with the secrecy question, 
confusing the discussion.19 
 
(identification “prevents plaintiffs from using the discovery process as a means to obtain the defendant’s 
trade secrets.”); Data General Corp. v. SCI Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 5662, 1978 WL 22033, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 27, 1978) (identification serves to prevent the plaintiff from going through the defendant’s 
information to gain “an unfair business advantage.”); WEIL & BROWN, supra note 4, at § 8:58 (claiming 
that purpose of California’s identification statute is “to prevent plaintiff from conducting ‘fishing 
expeditions’ into competitors’ business files by unfounded claims of trade secret misappropriation.”).
17 See Roup v. Super. Ct., No. B188652, L.A.S.C. No. BC328972, 2006 WL 710891, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 22, 2006) (unpublished). 
18 See, e.g., Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-12102-
RWZ, 2005 WL 283200, at *1 (D. Mass Feb. 7, 2005) (referring to unspecified “rules” when refusing again 
to require detailed identification: “CHE objects to the Master’s denial of yet another attempt to gain 
detailed identification of Storage Tech’s copyright and trade secret claims.  Much of what the Master 
rejected, the court had previously ruled out of order, or Storage Tech had in the interim supplied.  The rules 
do not sanction the degree of detail CHE seeks to extract.”); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware 
Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-12102-RWZ, 2003 WL 22462494, at *1 (D. Mass Oct. 30, 2003) 
(on pre-discovery order in software case, rejecting defendant’s attempt to find out exactly what source code 
was claimed as secret: “Defendant proposed that plaintiff provide a detailed list of the trade secret allegedly 
misappropriated to which plaintiff objects.  This appears to be another request for the identification of each 
line of the maintenance source code implicated in these proceedings.  I remain unpersuaded that defendant 
is either entitled to discover that level of detail or that such is necessary to mount an adequate defense.”). 
19 See, e.g., Excelligence Learning Corp. v. Oriental Trading Co., No. 5:03-CV-4947 JF (RS), 2004 WL 
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¶34 The second mistake is assuming that descriptions of technical categories and 
concepts such as “source code” or “placement of capacitors in the schematic for the ABC 
project” are sufficient to identify alleged secrets – perhaps because courts do not always 
recognize how much public domain information exists in such broadly defined technical 
categories.  We will describe several such rulings below. 
¶35 The third common mistake, and perhaps the worst, is accepting a plaintiff’s 
argument that because “combination trade secrets” are claimed, the plaintiff need not 
make a precise identification of such alleged secrets.  A “combination trade secret” is a 
multi-element claim that, when valid, ties non-secret items of information together in a 
unique manner to form a trade secret.  The concept is dangerous, however, because trade 
secret plaintiffs often string together non-secret items that have no functional 
interrelationship to avoid a defendant’s showing that the individual items are non-secret.  
Attorneys also use the “combination” concept to alter claims, and to create more sets of 
alleged intellectual property than the plaintiff ever actually thought about or linked 
together.  But combination claims can fail for a number of reasons, just as individual 
trade secret claims can, and thus they should not provide a shield against identification.20 
¶36 Trade secret plaintiffs use the “combination” argument during identification 
disputes to confuse courts and escape a precise identification of the alleged secrets.  If a 
defendant argues for a precise identification, the plaintiff will often respond that it claims 
“combination” secrets in an “entire process” rather than individual secrets, and that 
identifying individual elements should therefore be unnecessary.  Or, to the same effect, 
the plaintiff argues that its secret is its entire base of software source code, its entire chip 
design, and so forth, without regard to identifying what exactly about those broad 
categories are asserted as an allegedly misappropriated secret. 
¶37 The “combination” concept can create a major loophole for a plaintiff 
seeking to avoid identification.  Perhaps most dangerous, a plaintiff can use the 
“combination” theory to alter and revise its claims in different mixes of subsets, to 
gerrymander a claim so that the defense cannot focus its research efforts on defeating the 
final version.  If we take, for example, seven software algorithms and assume that five are 
in the public domain, the plaintiff might alter the claim several times to create subsets of 
the seven where at least one of the included algorithms is secret, in order to claim the 
non-secret algorithms as secret as well.  With a simple set of seven, there is a multiplicity 
of mathematically possible variations of subsets of two or more elements.  Of course, the 
 
2452834, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2004) (reviewing whether plaintiff’s Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. sec. 
2019.210 identification statement was sufficient and asking whether the information was secret instead of 
whether identification was sufficiently specific); Momswin, L.L.C. v. Lutes, No. Civ.A. 02-2195-KHV, 
2003 WL 21554944, at *7 (D. Kan. July 8, 2003) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment for 
failure to establish conclusively that information was secret, but seemingly conflating identification 
requirement with secrecy requirement in discussion); Lovell Farms, Inc. v. Levy, 641 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 
Ct. App. 1994) (affirming denial of request for temporary restraining order and requiring that plaintiff first 
show existence of trade secret; seemingly blending an identification requirement and proof of secrecy 
through an in-camera review procedure); Gabriel Int’l, Inc. v. M&D Indus. of Lou., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 522, 
524-25 (W.D. La. 1989) (in confusing ruling, court required that a trade secret plaintiff prove the existence 
of a secret early in the lawsuit, apparently before seeking third party discovery, but in so doing appears to 
have conflated the need to identify the alleged secrets with the ultimate proof of secrecy or non-secrecy). 
20 For a detailed description of “combination trade secret” claims and citations to numerous cases where 
such claims have failed, see Tait Graves & Alexander Macgillivray, Combination Trade Secrets and the 
Logic of Intellectual Property, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 261 (2004). 





                                                
algorithms may not in reality interoperate together, and perhaps should properly be 
defined as individual trade secret claims rather than “combination” claims.  But without 
requiring a precise identification of the “combination” trade secret at issue, the defense 
may be unable to raise that argument.  Courts need to be aware of this common litigation 
tactic and nail down exactly what permutations and subsets are actually claimed as secret. 
¶38 But all too often, courts have confused the question of (1) whether the 
plaintiff claims “combination” secrets instead of individual secrets with (2) whether the 
plaintiff should be required to precisely identify its alleged trade secrets regardless of 
whether they are claimed in combinations or individually. 
¶39 There are several published rulings where courts have failed to require a 
precise identification of the alleged secrets as a result of conflating these two issues.21  In 
one, a plaintiff vaguely claimed secrets somewhere within 500 pages of materials, and the 
defendant argued on appeal after a jury verdict that the plaintiff did not specify what the 
secrets were.  The court merely noted that a plaintiff can have a combination trade secret 
in material that includes elements that are individually non-secret, and did not ask 
whether any such combination had been properly identified.22  And in one of the most 
questionable trade secret rulings on record, a Pennsylvania district court rejected a 
defendant’s identification argument by holding that the plaintiff’s set of generalized 
business concepts for running a tanning salon was an “entire methodology” that added up 
to form a trade secret, without any specific identification.  By avoiding the identification 
analysis and stringing together vague business concepts into a combination trade secret, 
the decision essentially created a non-competition agreement and held the defendant 
liable for violating it.23  Of course, a plaintiff certainly is capable of properly identifying 
an alleged combination trade secret.24  Indeed, many courts have required precise 
identification of “combination trade secrets.”  We will discuss those cases below when 
proposing solutions.   
¶40 With these policy considerations and common mistakes in mind, we will 
survey the nationwide case law, and then offer specific proposals for addressing 
identification disputes. 
 
21 Courts sometimes sidestep the identification question by accepting a plaintiff’s argument that its entire 
process or software was at issue.  See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 662 (4th 
Cir. 1993) (refusing to overturn jury verdict despite plaintiff’s failure to identify precise secrets, and 
affirming on questionable ground that entire object code software was secret without addressing whether 
any secrets were identified in the functionality or other aspects of the executable software; even with 
finalized object code, we believe that a plaintiff should identify what about the software is not generally 
known to the trade); Touchpoint Solutions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 345 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28-29 (D. 
Mass. 2004) (granting in part plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction despite defendant’s argument 
that plaintiff had not specifically identified alleged secrets; court accepted plaintiff’s characterization of 
“source code, implementation, overall design and ‘distributed computing model’” as a design that was 
“unique, complex, and apparently valuable” without focusing on whether specific details had been 
identified). 
22 See 3M Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2001). 
23 See Tan-Line Studios, Inc. v. Bradley, Civ.A. No. 84-5925, 1986 WL 3764, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 
1986) (ruling following bench trial; referring to general definition of a combination trade secret). 
24 See Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 432 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff claimed 
combination trade secret in chemical process and “did put in evidence detailed descriptions of the Process,” 
though specificity unclear from published decision). 
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III. HOW COURTS NATIONWIDE HAVE ADDRESSED IDENTIFICATION DISPUTES 
¶41 There are several stages of a case where courts face disputes over the 
identification of alleged trade secrets:  the pleading stage, on a request for a temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction, just before discovery begins, during 
discovery, on a motion for summary judgment, during trial, and after trial. 
¶42 For the most part, the majority trend is to require a detailed identification of 
alleged secrets – particularly on a request for an injunction, during discovery, and on a 
motion for summary judgment.  Rulings are inconsistent at the pleading stage, probably 
because of liberal notice pleading requirements.  In turn, rulings after trial often go 
against the defendant, likely because the defense waited too long to raise the 
identification issue and, more importantly, because courts are loath to overturn jury 
verdicts. 
A. The Pleading Stage 
¶43 In some cases, trade secret defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, 
or to obtain a more definite statement, when the plaintiff is vague regarding the alleged 
secrets.  Some courts have required more information at the pleading stage,25 though 
plaintiffs obviously need not disclose material believed to be secret in a public complaint, 
and liberal notice pleading standards often mean little is required.26  As one court 
explained the general rule, “courts are in general agreement that trade secrets need not be 
disclosed in detail in a complaint alleging misappropriation . . . .  The query is whether 
 
25 See, e.g., Metis Int’l, L.L.C. v. Ace INA Holdings, Inc., No.Civ.A.SA.04CA-1033-XR, 2005 WL 
1072587, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 6, 2005) (granting Rule 12(e) motion and requiring plaintiff to plead more 
about the categories of alleged secrets being claimed); Cambridge Internet Solutions, Inc. v. Avicon Group, 
No. 99-1841, 1999 WL 959673, at *2 (Mass. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1999) (granting in part motion for a more 
definite statement where plaintiff alleged that some alleged secrets where in specific document, but did not 
do so for alleged “customer material” secrets); Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 253 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1968) (sustaining demurrer to third amended complaint where plaintiff failed to provide more than 
highly generalized description of alleged secrets; “the complainant should describe the subject matter of the 
trade secret with sufficient particularity to separate it from matters of general knowledge in the trade or of 
special knowledge of those persons who are skilled in the trade, and to permit the defendant to ascertain at 
least the boundaries within which the secret lies.”); AMP, Inc. v. McCaughey, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 109, 118 
(Pa. Ct. Cm. Pl. 1966) (“In requiring a more specific pleading, we are not indicating that plaintiff must 
plead trade secret processes, trade secrets, or the like.  However, it is apparent that plaintiff can provide 
defendants with at least an identification and nature of the products, persons, time and places involved, so 
as to permit them to know that against which they are to prepare a defense.”). 
26 See, e.g., Automed Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (general references to 
categories of alleged secrets sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss, but “plaintiff will ultimately need to 
identify which specific designs, software or research defendant allegedly misappropriated.”); Kosower v. 
Gutowitz, No. 00 Civ. 9011(JGK), 2001 WL 1488440, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2001) (general references 
to claimed secrets permissible because facts as alleged must be treated as true; motion to dismiss denied); 
Labor Ready, Inc. v. Williams Staffing, L.L.C, 149 F. Supp. 2d 398, 411 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (denying Rule 
12(e) motion because general identification of alleged secrets met notice pleading standards; noting that 
more would be required at the summary judgment stage;); Cinebase Software v. Media Guaranty Trust, 
Inc., No. C98-1100 FMS, 1998 WL 661465, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1998) (on motion to dismiss, 
identification “in general terms” sufficed, but “plaintiff will have to identify its alleged trade secrets with 
much greater particularity in order to prevail on this claim”); Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., No. CIV.A. 00C-
10-249JRS, 2002 WL 393056, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Del. Mar. 14, 2002) (dismissing third amended complaint 
with prejudice where plaintiff did not provide any detail for allegedly misappropriated trade secrets, even 
though complaint filed partially under seal and plaintiff pointed to attached documents, claiming “whole 
process” as secret), rev’d, 812 A.2d 894, 897 (Del. 2002) (reversing based on liberal pleading standards). 





                                                
the allegations provide the defendant with notice as to the substance of the claims.” 27  In 
some cases where courts have required more detail in a complaint, it is unclear whether 
the amended complaint would be filed under seal, though it would seem that a 
confidential or redacted filing would be appropriate.28 
B. Requests for Injunctive Relief 
¶44 Many trade secret cases begin with a rushed request for a temporary 
restraining order or preliminary injunction.  At that stage, trade secret plaintiffs 
sometimes make only vague references to the alleged secrets, without providing details.  
As a result, courts have repeatedly used the identification requirement as a ground to 
deny the request.29  Given the courts’ general reluctance to enjoin a defendant’s 
 
27 See Dick Corp. v. SNC-Lavalin Constr., Inc., No. 04 C 1043, 2004 WL 2967556 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 
2004) (on motion to dismiss and for a more definite statement, general reference to “Joint Venture Data” 
sufficed). 
28 See Combined Metals of Chi. Ltd. Part. v. Airtek, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 827, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (to prevent 
cross-plaintiff from modifying claims later, and to provide fair notice, court ordered party to identify 
“specific, concrete secrets” in amended cross-complaint). 
29 See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 522-23 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing 
preliminary injunction in part where plaintiff failed to “specifically identify” alleged secrets claimed to 
reside within a “diagnostic software and operating system”); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 750 F.2d 
952, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying apparent federal common law to affirm denial of preliminary 
injunction where, among other things, “Litton’s Achilles Heel on this record is its insistence on postponing 
identification or description of such a broad universe of thousands of unidentified trade secrets”); 
Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that trial court had correctly 
denied earlier permanent injunction request because plaintiff had no first “specifically identified and 
proved” its alleged secrets); Internet Inc. v. Tensar Polytech., Inc., No. Civ. 05-317RHKAJB, 2005 WL 
2453170, at *6 n.8 (D. Minn. Oct. 3, 2005) (denying request for preliminary injunction when, inter alia, 
plaintiff did not “identif[y] specific products that have been successfully modified with the use of 
information from Brand, much less with the use of specific information alleged to be Internet’s trade 
secrets”); Diamond Power Int’l, Inc. v. Clyde Bergemann, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 
2005) (denying motion for preliminary injunction when plaintiff claimed secrets in dry hub carriage for 
sootblower cleaning system but could not identify specific items claimed as trade secrets); Hypred S.A. v. 
Pochard, No. Civ.04-2773(JNE/JGL), 2004 WL 1386149, at * 5 (D. Minn. June 18, 2004) (rejecting trade 
secret portion of requested preliminary injunction because plaintiff failed to identify specific alleged secrets 
and claimed only generic categories of “product formation and manufacturing secrets”); Vital State Can., 
Ltd. v. Dreampak, LLC, 303 F. Supp. 2d 516, 521-23 (D.N.J. 2003) (denying preliminary injunction where 
plaintiff identified “overbroad and vague” technology categories, and repeatedly “shifted” its attempted 
identifications); Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 19, 2003) (rejecting motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff claimed secrets in “unique 
combination of functions and capabilities” in certain software, “customer preferences,” product 
documentation, and source code; court rejected claims, noting “As for its source code, Compuware has for 
whatever reason failed to identify any specific lines of source code that have been taken by IBM.”); 
Motorola, Inc. v. Dbtel Inc., No. 02 C 3336, 2002 WL 1610982, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. July 22, 2002) 
(plaintiff offered somewhat detailed testimony making general claims about several aspects of its 
technology, but court found that evidence “confusing, inconsistent, and lacks specificity;” court was unable 
to tell what exactly plaintiff wanted to enjoin, particularly where “many aspects of Motorola’s process for 
creating a cellular phone involve publicly available equipment and standards,” and refused to issue 
injunction); FSI Int’l v. Shumway, No. CIV.02-402RHKSRN, 2002 WL 334409, at *9 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 
2002) (same where plaintiff sought temporary restraining order but offered only generalized categories 
instead of identifying alleged secrets); Newleaf Designs, L.L.C v. Bestbins Corp., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 
1043-44 (D. Minn. 2001) (same where plaintiff failed to identify several alleged secrets); Am. Sci. & Eng’g 
Inc. v. Kelly, 69 F. Supp. 2d 227, 238 (D. Mass. 1999) (preliminary injunction denied where plaintiff failed 
to identify alleged secrets in collimator device); Visionair, Inc. v. James, 606 S.E.2d 359, 364 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2004) (affirming denial of request for preliminary injunction where plaintiff “has failed to identify 
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employment or business on an expedited proceeding without a careful review of the 
evidence, it is not surprising that plaintiffs’ failures to identify the information at issue 
provides a ready reason for a denial. 
¶45 Of course, some trade secret plaintiffs do provide a sufficient identification of 
their claims when seeking injunctive relief.30  Indeed, one would expect that in egregious 
cases – where, say, a former employee downloaded key non-public files the day before 
resigning – a plaintiff should easily be able to make a precise identification of the alleged 
secrets to support its request. 
¶46 At least one court has required little identification on a request for injunctive 
relief.  That court held that “source code” was a sufficient identification on a request for a 
preliminary injunction, and attacked the defendant for considering its own software to be 
confidential while also seeking a better identification of the plaintiff’s claim.31  The court 
may have conflated the separate considerations of whether or not alleged trade secret is 
truly secret and whether or not the plaintiff adequately identified the alleged trade secret, 
 
with any specificity the trade secrets allegedly misappropriated, mentioning only broad product and 
technology categories.”); IBM Corp. v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 941 F. Supp. 98, 100 (D. Minn. 1992) (same 
where plaintiff admitted that its descriptions of alleged disk drive secrets “do not purport to define precisely 
the boundaries of each trade secret.”); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., Civil Action No. 81-2216-S, 1981 WL 
2162 (D. Mass. Dec. 3, 1981) (request denied where plaintiff failed to identify alleged secrets); Lee 
Pharms. v. Den-Mart, Inc., 1976 WL 21026 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (somewhat confusing early case where court 
delayed hearing on requested preliminary injunction in part because plaintiff had refused to identify alleged 
secrets); Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 579 S.E.2d 449, 453-54 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming denial 
of motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff claimed combination trade secret in chip designs, 
submitted documents and schematics, and listed general concepts such as “the overall design and 
implementation of Analog’s 94xx products”; Court stated “Analog invites this Court to acknowledge the 
existence of trade secrets in the submitted information without bearing the burden of identifying those trade 
secrets.  We will not read into Analog’s claims specific identification of devices worthy of trade secret 
protection when it is Analog’s burden to come forward with evidence of such devices.”); Grow Co., Inc. v. 
Chokshi, 2006 WL 551367, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 3, 2006) (unpublished) (motion to reconsider denial 
of preliminary injunction denied where plaintiff “fails to specifically identify a trade secret” in “processes 
and formulations”); Iron Age Corp. v. Dvorak, 880 A.2d 657, 665-66 (Pa. Ct. App. 2005) (denying 
preliminary injunction based on “inevitable disclosure”-type theory denied, in part because plaintiff failed 
to identify allegedly confidential information at issue); Southwest Research Inst. v. Keraplast Tech., Ltd., 
103 S.W.3d 478, 483 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (vacating temporary restraining order where plaintiff “failed to 
identify any specific trade secret that should be protected,” and instead broadly claimed that everything 
defendant learned from plaintiff was secret). 
30 See e.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1453 (2002) (holding that plaintiff 
sufficiently identified alleged secrets during request for temporary restraining order though combination of 
generic categories and “descriptions made pursuant to” California Code of Civil Procedure section 
2019.210 and other pleadings; published opinion did not quote from the latter documents, no doubt to 
preserve the claimed secrecy, thus leaving unclear what level of precision was supplied); Lowell Anderson, 
Litigation Issues, in TRADE SECRETS PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA § 11.21 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (“Unfortunately 
for practitioners seeking guidance on §2019(d), the court based its ruling in part on information contained 
in the plaintiff’s §2019(d) statement, which was not disclosed in the published opinion.”).  At least two 
subsequent federal cases have incorrectly assumed that Whyte stood for the proposition that California’s 
section 2019.210 allows identification by generic categories – though the subsequent Advanced Modular 
Sputtering case, discussed below, mooted the question by setting forth the California standard.  See, e.g., 
Pixion, Inc. v. Placeware, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Excelligence Learning Corp 
v. Oriental Trading Co., Inc., No. 5:03-CV-4947 JF (RS), 2004 WL 2452834, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 
2004). 
31 See Cisco Sys., Inc v. Huawei Tech., Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 551, 555-56 (E.D. Tex. 2003) (granting 
preliminary injunction; no sign in published opinion that plaintiff provided specific identification of alleged 
software code trade secrets). 





                                                
because it did not provide a separate analysis for identification and then secrecy in 
sequential order. 
¶47 An issue related to injunctive relief is whether the court itself properly 
identifies the alleged secrets in the order so that the defendant knows exactly what it is 
forbidden from using.  Some appellate courts have reversed orders for injunctive relief on 
this basis. 32  It stands to reason that if a trade secret plaintiff fails to provide a precise 
identification of its alleged secrets, a court will not be able to issue an appropriately 
specific order against the defendant. 
C. The Pre-Discovery Stage 
¶48 If a defendant does not challenge the specificity of the complaint, and if the 
plaintiff does not seek immediate injunctive relief, the next phase of the case where 
identification disputes arise is the moment when the plaintiff seeks to commence 
discovery on its trade secret accusations.  Several jurisdictions have required that trade 
secret plaintiffs make at least a “reasonably particular” identification of their alleged 
secrets as a condition precedent to seeking discovery from the defendant.  In those 
jurisdictions, pre-discovery identification disputes are common. 
¶49 Courts in several states (or federal courts applying state law) have required a 
pre-discovery identification procedure by common law:  Delaware,33 Illinois,34 
Massachusetts,35 Minnesota – which requires the most detail36 – and possibly Florida.37  
 
32 See, e.g., Corning Inc. v. Picvue Elec., Ltd., 365 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (remanding where trial court’s 
preliminary injunction was too vague under FRCP Rule 65; impossible to tell from order what information 
was subject of the injunction); Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1121-22 (Fed. Cir. 
1996) (two post-judgment inunctions overbroad under Rule 65(d) for failure to specify exactly what 
information was barred from use); American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 333 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(reversing preliminary injunction in part because order was too vague under Rule 65(d); order barred used 
of “compositionally similar” inks which could be “attributed principally” to the plaintiff’s trade secrets 
without identifying precisely what was barred); E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 
1114-15 (8th Cir. 1969) (setting aside preliminary injunction where order was “excessively broad” under 
FRCP 65(d) and listed only high-level technical categories instead of specifying exactly what information 
was subject of injunction); Microstrategy, Inc. v. Business Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 431 (E.D. 
Va. 2004) (in post-trial, permanent injunction following finding of misappropriation, plaintiff’s proposed 
injunction “too broad” in scope; limiting injunction to “specific documents identified as trade secrets”). 
33 See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D. Del. 1991) (denying 
discovery against defendant because plaintiff’s statement too high-level); Miles Inc. v. Cookson Am., Inc., 
Civ. A. No. 12,310, 1992 WL 136381, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 16, 1992) (unpublished) (statement generally 
outlining alleged secrets insufficient to take discovery against defendant); Magnox v. Turner, Civ. A. No. 
11951, 1991 WL 182450, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1991) (unpublished) (same where plaintiff served 
discovery without first making identification of alleged secrets with reasonable particularity); Engelhard 
Corp. v. Savin Corp., 505 A.2d 30, 33 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same where plaintiff failed to make required 
statement with reasonable particularity); Data Gen. Corp. v. SCI Sys., Inc., Civ. A. No. 5662, 1978 WL 
22033, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1978) (unpublished) (early case allowing defendant to file papers with 
court stating which alleged secrets in plaintiff’s identification it was “unable to comprehend” in order to 
rule on motion for protective order). 
34 See Automed Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925-26 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Delaware law to 
hold that plaintiff must identify alleged secrets with “reasonable particularity” before taking discovery “so 
that we can evaluate the relevance of plaintiff’s discovery and address any objections.”). 
35 See L-3 Comm. Corp. v. Reveal Imaging Tech., Inc., 2004 WL 2915743, at *13 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 
2004) (holding that plaintiff must specifically identify alleged secrets before commencing discovery).  This 
decision is only an unpublished trial court order, however, so the status of pre-discovery identification 
remains unclear in Massachusetts.  
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In addition, a federal court in New York has addressed a defendant’s argument that the 
plaintiff should not be able to start discovery on the trade secret claim without first 
making an identification of the alleged secrets by sending the dispute to a discovery 
master, but it did not attempt to craft a rule of general application to other cases. 38  
¶50 California is the only state to codify a pre-discovery identification rule by 
statute.39  California’s legislature enacted what is now Code of Civil Procedure section 
2019.210 in 1985 as part of the state’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act.  The impetus for the 
statute came from a state bar memorandum to the state legislature proposing the text of 
the statute and noting the discovery abuses that trade secret plaintiffs often engage in 
when they fail to identify the alleged secrets: 
One area not addressed by the Uniform Act is the area of plaintiff’s abuse 
in initiating trade secret lawsuits for the purpose of harassing or even driv-
ing a competitor out of business by forcing the competitor to spend large 
sums in defending unwarranted litigation.  For example, when a plaintiff’s 
employee quits and opens a competing business, a plaintiff often files a 
lawsuit for trade secret misappropriation which states that the defendant 
took and is using plaintiff’s trade secrets, but does not identify the trade 
secrets.  The plaintiff can then embark upon extensive discovery which the 
new business is ill equipped to afford.  Furthermore, by not informing the 
defendant with any degree of specificity as to what the alleged trade se-
crets are, defendant may be forced to disclose its own business trade se-
crets, even though those matters may be irrelevant, and the defendant may 
not learn the exact nature of the supposedly misappropriated trade secrets 
until the eve of trial.40
¶51 Courts and commentators have identified a number of salutary policy goals 
California’s statute serves,41 though again we do not agree with all of them and find their 
 
36 See Porous Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 598, 600 (D. Minn. 1999) (where plaintiff 
described only six high-level concepts, court held that trade secret plaintiffs must provide an identification 
with “the same specificity” required on a motion for preliminary injunction or at trial; “The orderly 
disposition of cases involving claims of misappropriation of trade secrets cannot permit a situation where 
the details concerning the claimed trade secrets are not disclosed at an early date in the litigation.”). 
37 See Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
(applying both California pre-discovery statute and Florida common law to require identification with 
reasonable particularity in a case where some discovery had already begun; not entirely clear whether court 
believed that district courts applying Florida trade secret law should apply a pre-discovery identification 
procedure in future cases).   
38 See Power Conversion, Inc. v. Saft Am., Inc., 1985 WL 1016, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1985) (where 
both parties accused one another of misappropriation, matter sent to independent expert to receive parties’ 
submissions and designate areas for discovery).  It should be noted that discovery masters are subject to 
confidentiality requirements – often as defined in the parties’ protective order governing the case. 
39 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (West 2006) (“In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade 
secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . before commencing discovery relating to the trade secret, 
the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity subject to 
any orders that may be appropriate under [the UTSA subsection relating to confidentiality orders].”). 
40 Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (quoting from 
statute’s legislative history). 
41 Policies cited include (1) preventing overbroad trade secret accusations that improperly include 
information in the public domain; (2) giving the defendants fair notice of the exact charges against them 
before discovery begins; and (3) preventing plaintiffs from conducting “fishing expeditions” into the files 





                                                                                                                                                
summaries incomplete.  Federal courts in California have applied the statute in trade 
secret cases under the Erie Doctrine,42 and courts elsewhere have also used it in cases 
under California law. 43 
¶52 Because so many trade secret cases have arisen in Silicon Valley, rulings on 
the degree of specificity required under California’s pre-discovery statute have been 
common in the federal Northern District of California.44  One such ruling is worth 
quoting, to illustrate how courts applying California law differ from courts in those 
jurisdictions which lack a pre-discovery identification requirement: 
¶53 The Amended Identification of Trade Secrets shall be narrowed to include 
only items that Plaintiff considers are its actual trade secrets, and only those trade secrets 
that Plaintiff has reasonable grounds to allege were misappropriated. . . .  If Plaintiff 
contends that a trade secret consists of a specific combination of items, it shall so state 
and concisely describe the combination.  If Plaintiff contends that its specific use of an 
otherwise publicly known item constitutes its secret, it shall so state and concisely 
describe the use.  All trade secrets shall be described in narrative form, rather than by 
cross-reference to other trade secrets or documents.  If Plaintiff references a document as 
setting forth one or more trade secrets, it shall specify precisely which portions of the 
document describe the trade secret(s).45 
¶54 And in 2005, a California appellate court for the first time issued a ruling 
providing guidelines for what the statute requires.  The court held that while absolute 
precision is not required at the pre-discovery stage, enough must be provided to separate 
alleged secrets from matters known to the trade: 
The letter and spirit of section 2019.210 require the plaintiff, subject to an 
appropriate protective order, to identify or designate the trade secrets at is-
sue with “‘sufficient particularity’” to limit the permissible scope of dis-
covery by distinguishing the trade secrets “‘from matters of general 
knowledge in the trade or of special knowledge of those persons . . . 
skilled in the trade.’” . . .  The degree of “particularity” that is “reason-
able” will differ, depending on the alleged trade secret at issue in each 
case.  Where, as here, the alleged trade secrets at issue consist of incre-
mental variations on, or advances in the state of the art in a highly special-
 
of business rivals in order to concoct charges against them.  See id. at 985; WEIL & BROWN, supra note 4, 
at § 8.60 (describing purposes of statute); MILGRIM, supra note 4, at § 16.01[5][b] (noting fair notice aspect 
of the statute). 
42 See Computer Econ., 50 F. Supp. 2d at 985 (detailing purposes of statute and its legislative history).  See 
also Neothermia Corp. v. Rubicor Med., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that 
using the statute in a manner inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding amendments 
could create an Erie problem). 
43 See, e.g., Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 2002 WL 14361, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2002) 
(noting that special master had ruled on section 2019.210 issues such that discovery could commence). 
44 See, e.g., Myrio Corp. v. Minerva Network Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10461, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. April 
4, 2001) (finding statement insufficient); Sys. Am., Inc. v. Softline, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. October 30, 1996) (finding statement “insufficient” and “extremely broad” where it outlined 
“a number of categories of documents”); Cal. Micro Devices Corp. v. Universal Semiconductor, Inc., 1995 
WL 705144, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 1995) (noting that because plaintiff had provided Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code sec. 2019.210 statement, defendant had to respond to deposition questions by plaintiff). 
45 See Myrio Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10461, at *1-3. 
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ized technical field, a more exacting level of particularity may be required 
to distinguish the alleged trade secrets from matters already known to per-
sons skilled in that field.46
¶55 It remains somewhat unclear what “reasonable particularity” means in any 
given case.  Does it mean that a plaintiff must provide 51 percent of the details that would 
be necessary for a completely precise identification of each claim, 67 percent, 75 percent, 
or more?  None of the jurisdictions that require a pre-discovery identification with 
“reasonable particularity” have yet defined exactly what minimum degree of precision a 
trade secret plaintiff must aim for. 
D. The Discovery Stage 
¶56 The discovery stage is the heart of where identification disputes arise, 
because discovery is the means by which the defense can demand a complete, precise 
identification of each alleged secret.  Again, however, the courts have been inconsistent 
in the amount of detail they have required – though the skill with which the defense 
demands identification no doubt plays a role in the varying holdings.   
¶57 Some courts have readily granted defense motions to compel a detailed 
identification of the trade secret claims, usually in response to defense interrogatories.47  
In a 2006 Washington case, for example, the defendant served an identification 
interrogatory.  In response, the plaintiff “referenced its complaint and then listed generic 
categories of trade secrets:  ‘installer list/network,’ ‘pricing strategy and policies,’ and 
‘customer lists.’” It also included the evasive phrase “among other things.”  The court 
granted a motion to compel, noting that “[d]efendants are entitled to discovery related to 
all of the so-called ‘other things’ allegedly misappropriated.”48  
¶58 In turn, a 2005 Texas case describes how, on a motion to compel, a trial court 
addressed a plaintiff’s recitation of generic concepts in its initial response by flipping 
 
46 See Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 835-36 (2005). 
47 See Dapco Indus., Inc. v. Matec Corp., 1998 WL 563847, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (affirming 
dismissal of complaint because plaintiff did not respond to identification interrogatory or court order on 
motion to compel requiring the same); StonCor Group, Inc. v. Campton, 2006 WL 314336, at *1-2 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 7, 2006) (granting motion to compel); Excelligence Learning Corp v. Oriental Trading Co., 
2004 WL 2452834, at *3-5 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2004) (granting motion to compel interrogatory requesting 
that plaintiff “identify in detail” alleged secrets where plaintiff had apparently listed only general 
categories); Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 2002 WL 485710, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2002) 
(issuing sanctions where defendant won motion to compel regarding interrogatory requesting identification 
of alleged secrets but plaintiff “dragged its feet” in responding, and merely listed functions of allegedly 
secret software); Multimedia Cablevision, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Co-op, Inc., 1996 WL 447815, at *1-2 (D. Kan. 
Jul. 30, 1996) (defendant’s interrogatory only asked plaintiff to identify the documents which comprised 
the basis for the trade secret claim; nonetheless, court granted motion to compel a better answer regarding 
the documents in question and issued sanctions against plaintiff); Uresil Corp. v. Cook Group, Inc., 135 
F.R.D. 168, 174 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (granting motion to compel better interrogatory responses; “[I]t is clear 
that Uresil has not identified the components and/or concepts incorporated in the products Uresil claims 
Cook misappropriated.  Nor does Uresil identify all information and documents alleged by Uresil to be 
confidential and to have been misappropriated by the defendant.”); See also Microwave Research Corp. v. 
Sanders Assoc., Inc., 110 F.R.D. 669, 673-75 (D. Mass. 1986) (denying plaintiff’s motion to compel 
defendant to produce documents where, after depositions, plaintiff identified only a general list of products 
in which it claimed trade secrets; discussion and holding are somewhat unclear). 
48 See StonCor, 2006 WL 314336, at *1-2. 





                                                
those categories back at the plaintiff and requiring a precise identification regarding each 
of them:49  There, the court ordered the plaintiff to 
“state specifically the identity of each ‘functionality,’ ‘data field,’ ‘rule,’ 
reflex,’ ‘structure,’ ‘design,’ ‘architecture,’ ‘integration of combination of 
various components,’ ‘negative knowledge,’ ‘method or process utilized 
for manipulation information,’ ‘trigger,’ ‘calculation code,’ ‘formula,’ 
‘distribution,’ and ‘format, content, sequence, total structure and record 
selection of various reports,’ or other feature, function or element of 
[plaintiff’s] automobile dealership management system or related written 
materials that is the subject of this case that [plaintiff] contend[s] is a trade 
secret accessed or misappropriated by [appellees].  Each trade secret 
claimed by [plaintiff] shall be separately identified by [it] in such an-
swers.”50
¶59 In another case, a court rejected the plaintiff’s initial interrogatory response, 
which listed a set of generic and conclusory phrases and made generalized references to a 
“ratio of ingredients.”  The court noted that the plaintiff “does not state how the ratio of 
ingredients relates to the manufacturing process, nor does it precisely describe how the 
manufacturing process varies according to the factors it has recited.”  In requiring a better 
response, the court held that the plaintiff’s “answers concerning the nature of its alleged 
trade secrets are evasive, ambiguous, and incomplete.”51 
¶60 Similarly, a Pennsylvania court in an early case from 1972 found a trade 
secret plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories seeking a specific identification of the 
alleged secrets “wholly evasive and nonresponsive,” and reacted to the plaintiff’s 
recitation of generic categories by rhetorically asking the plaintiff what within them was 
alleged to be secret:52  “The answers to #20 can hardly be construed to enlighten 
Defendants as to the information allegedly misappropriated.  What are the confidential 
materials?  Who are the confidential suppliers of such materials?  What are the 
confidential names and addresses of such customers, potential customers, dealers, 
distributors and health department officials?”53 
¶61 Other courts have ruled against the plaintiff based on issues arising during a 
deposition,54 or sent the matter to a special master to oversee the identification process.55 
 
49 See Universal Computer Sys., Inc. v. Dealer Solutions, L.L.C., 183 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2005) (dicta discussion of prior case proceedings; holding concerned arbitration issues). 
50Id. at 745 n.1. 
51 See Unicure, Inc. v. Thurman, 97 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
52 See Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 344 F. Supp. 924, 928 (M.D. Penn. 1972) (granting motion for 
imposition of sanctions for failure to answer interrogatories, including designation of facts alleged by 
defendants as being established for purposes of litigation). 
53 Id. at 927. 
54 See Diversified Tech., Inc. v. Dubin, 156 F.R.D. 132 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (depublished) (issue preclusion 
sanctions where plaintiff’s refusal to identify alleged secrets included plaintiff’s attorney giving 
instructions not to answer identification questions during Rule 30(b)(6) deposition). 
55 See Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (in early case where special 
master ordered identification, plaintiff’s submission of list of documents in which alleged secrets were 
claimed to reside was insufficient). 
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¶62 But at least two courts have allowed plaintiffs to respond to interrogatories 
with more generalized information such as categories in which the alleged secrets fall.  
These appear to be the minority position, and it is not clear from the rulings how the 
defense worded its discovery requests.56  At least one court has not ordered more detail 
where the defendant’s request was badly constructed.57 
E. The Summary Judgment Stage 
¶63 A plaintiff’s failure to identify its alleged secrets during discovery can, and 
often does, lead to summary judgment.  Courts have frequently granted summary 
judgment for the defense based on a failure to sufficiently identify the trade secret 
claims.58 
¶64 In one of the most famous such cases,59 the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment on a trade secret claim where the plaintiff asserted secrets in a film projection 
 
56 See AlliantGroup, LP v. Axiom Custom Bus. Solutions, Inc., 2006 WL 568363, at *1 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(denying motion to compel regarding interrogatory requesting identification of specific alleged secrets 
because plaintiff “has sufficiently identified six categories of purported trade secret at issue”); C&F 
Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 1994 WL 36874, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying motion to compel where 
plaintiff attached further information identifying alleged secrets in its supplemental response though court 
did not clearly state whether any precision was supplied and held only that “IBP has been sufficiently 
apprised of the basis for C&F’s trade secret claim.”) (emphasis added). 
57 See Norbrook Labs., Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mfg. Co., 2003 WL 1956214, at *2-4 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (court 
faulted defendant for the way it crafted its discovery requests in denying further identification).   
58 See VFD Consulting, Inc. v. 21st Serv., 425 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1048-49 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (Minnesota law; 
plaintiff’s “fatal” error of failing to identify “with any particularity” an alleged secret, referring to “the 
MedDiag system” and former employee’s “experience and best judgment in the combination of the 
research data” for that system); Bradbury Co. v. Teissier-Ducros, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1222-24 (D. Kan. 
2006) (granting summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff provided no detail at all on allegedly 
secret technology and explaining that “Plaintiff has the burden under the KUTSA to define its trade secrets 
with the precision and particularity necessary to separate it from the general skill and knowledge possessed 
by others”); Mextel, Inc. v. Air-Shields, Inc., 2005 WL 226112, at *42 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2005) (summary 
judgment for defendant on trade secret claim about a “sensor module” where plaintiff failed to identify 
what information in documents was allegedly secret); Callaway Golf Co. v. Dunlop Slazenger Group Am., 
Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215-16 (D. Del. 2004) (California law; one claim rejected where plaintiff made 
only “conclusory allegations” about golf ball technology, referring generally to information that former 
employee obtained); Glynn Interactive, Inc. v. Itelehealth, Inc., 2004 WL 439236, at *5 (D. Md. Mar. 9, 
2004) (summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff made only exceedingly generic claim that secrets 
were in “expertise and information provided” and thus failed to identify alleged secrets); Nutrition Mgmt. 
v. Harborside Healthcare Corp., 2004 WL 764809, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2004) (summary judgment for 
defendant where fraud and other claims involved a trade secret accusation, but plaintiff did not identify 
secret); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2003 WL 22231544, at *5-6 (D. Minn. Sep. 25, 2003) 
(summary judgment for defendant where, among other things, plaintiff failed to specifically identify 
alleged secrets in a network storage appliance); Canter v. West Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1203 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999) (depublished) (same where, among other things, plaintiff disobeyed court’s order to identify 
alleged secrets pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code. sec. 2019.210 by pointing to 21 pages of documents); Utilase, 
Inc. v. Williamson, 1999 WL 717969, at *7 (6th Cir. Sep. 10, 1999) (unpublished) (summary judgment 
where plaintiff vaguely identified alleged secrets); Lynchval Sys., Inc. v. Chi. Consulting Actuaries, Inc., 
1998 WL 151814, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 1998) (summary judgment where plaintiff pointed only to 
defendant’s technology instead of identifying alleged secrets in its own technology); Furniture Consultants, 
Inc. v. Acme Steel Door Corp., 658 N.Y.S.2d 284, 285 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997) (total failure to identify 
alleged secrets); Julie Research Lab., Inc. v. Select Photographic Eng’g, 810 F. Supp. 513, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (same where plaintiff failed to identify an alleged secret separate from public domain information), 
aff’d, 998 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1993); Universal Analytics, Inc. v. MacNeal-Schwendler Corp., 707 F. Supp. 
1170, 1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (same where plaintiff failed to identify any alleged secrets at all). 
59 See IMAX Corp v. Cinema Tech., Inc., 152 F.3d 1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting summary 





                                                                                                                                                
system.  The plaintiff failed to identify the precise dimensions and tolerances that 
constituted its alleged secrets in responding to discovery requests, and the court affirmed 
the district court and noted that the lack of identification in a “sophisticated and highly 
complex projector system” left the defendant unable to “prepare its rebuttal.”60 
¶65 In another case, the Seventh Circuit used harsh language against the plaintiff 
when affirming summary judgment on a software-based trade secret allegation.61  The 
plaintiff argued that it had identified its trade secret claims in a 43-page document, but 
the court rejected that attempt: 
According to IDX, “a 43-page description of the methods and processes 
underlying and the interrelationships among various features making up 
IDX’s software package” is enough.  No, it isn’t.  These 43 pages describe 
the software; although the document was created for litigation, it does not 
separate the trade secrets from the other information that goes into any 
software package.  Which aspects are known to the trade, and which are 
not?  That’s vital under the statutory definition.  Likewise, IDX’s tender of 
the complete documentation for the software leaves mysterious exactly 
which pieces of information are the trade secrets.62
¶66 In another detailed ruling on a software analysis, a Wisconsin court affirmed 
a grant of summary judgment on a software claim by noting the many components that 
make up a software system, and faulted the plaintiff for not identifying what about its 
own CAD software was distinct from “general knowledge in this niche” of the CAD 
software industry.63 
¶67 But some courts, in our view, have gotten it wrong and allowed a plaintiff to 
survive summary judgment based on generic and non-specific sets of claims.64  As an 
example, a federal court in Illinois denied a summary judgment motion where a plaintiff 
pointed to a long list of items which apparently included such high-level category 
descriptions as “[a] series resonant inverter driven by a half-bridge” and “[m]eans for 
reducing the cathode heating voltage after lamp ignition.”  The court found these non-
specific categories to be “quite specific” in denying the motion.65   
 
judgment to defendant where plaintiff claimed secrets in film projector but in response to defendant’s 
interrogatory failed to specific exact trade secret claims “in the precise numerical dimensions and 
tolerances with sufficient particularity”). 
60 See id. at 1167. 
61 See IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2002). 
62 Id. at 583-84. 
63 See ECT Int’l, Inc. v. Zwerlein, 597 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming grant of summary 
judgment based on plaintiff’s failure to identify alleged software secrets in “software file system” because 
it did not “describe which of the components” of the software were allegedly misappropriated). 
64 See Twin Vision Corp. v. Bellsouth Commc’n Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 385135, at *3 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 1998) 
(unpublished) (though affirming grant of summary judgment on some claims, the court found plaintiff’s 
generic identification of “factory access code” to be specific enough to identify one trade secret claim); see 
also McElmurry v. Fergusson, Inc., 2006 WL 572330, at *19 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 8, 2006) (denying motion for 
summary judgment where plaintiff pointed to “formulas”; unclear whether any further detail was given).  
65 See Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 664, 673 (N.D. Ill. 1997).  It is possible that the defense 
failed to explain to the court that the phrases quoted above are not unique in themselves, and that any trade 
secret would exist in the specific implementation details rather than the broader concepts.  For example, the 
asserted but not identified “means” might be the place where the actual claimed trade secret would reside.  
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¶68 In another highly questionable ruling, a federal court in Connecticut denied a 
motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff apparently identified alleged secrets 
surrounding an executable software program in seven generic categories such as 
“‘descriptions . . . with regard to the concept of how the program worked,’” (ellipsis in 
original) and “‘the program itself.’”  The court appears to have allowed the “combination 
trade secret” tactic described above, and held that because combination trade secrets can 
exist, the plaintiff’s “metaphorical ‘recipe’” was a good enough trade secret claim to 
survive the motion.66 
¶69 And in some cases, of course, the plaintiff does provide detail sufficient to 
defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.67 
F. The Pre-Trial, Trial, and Post-Trial Stages  
¶70 In some cases, the plaintiff evades identification until the pre-trial stage, and 
courts sometimes react strongly against the plaintiff.68  In other cases, some cases make it 
all the way into trial or post-trial proceedings before the identification dispute comes to a 
head.  In many of these cases, it appears that the defense failed to raise the issue earlier, 
and sometimes the waiver is apparent.69  Some courts have ruled against the plaintiff,70 
 
A phrase that may appear complex to an outsider may be generic to one skilled in the art, but such 
distinctions must be drawn for a court reviewing an identification dispute. 
66 See Dreamcatcher Software Dev., L.L.C. v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 276, 282-
83 (D. Conn. 2004). 
67 See Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, 2005 WL 2369815, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (denying motion for 
summary judgment where plaintiff, in opposition papers, detailed its alleged software secrets by Bates 
number and file type.  The court noted that plaintiff had previously been vague in interrogatory responses, 
but “perhaps in part due to the way in which Defendants framed the question.”); Do it Best Corp. v. 
Passport Software, Inc., 2005 WL 743083, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2005) (plaintiff came “dangerously 
close” to losing on identification issue, but unlike other cases provided “specific lines of code and specific 
software features for which it claims protection.”); Luigino’s, Inc. v. Peterson, 2002 WL 122389, at *8-9 
(D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2002) (granting and denying in part motion for summary judgment where plaintiff 
sufficiently identified some alleged secrets, though degree of precision was not described, but alleged only 
general categories and referred to documents for others); Thermodyne Food Serv. Prod., Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 940 F. Supp. 1300, 1304-05 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (denying motion for summary judgment 
on trade secret claim where, among other things, plaintiff attached an identification to complaint that 
“identifies each component” of alleged secrets and was thus sufficient; presumably the identification was 
filed under seal); Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(denying summary judgment where plaintiff identified alleged secrets in appendix to complaint, but no 
details given about level of specificity); Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 2004 WL 1965869, at *6-7 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Jul. 15, 2004) (noting that “[w]hen the plaintiff claims a ‘compilation’ trade secret, courts generally 
require that the trade secret be identified with even greater specificity”; plaintiff’s identification, redacted 
from the published opinion, was sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment on trade secret 
element). 
68 See Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 2002 WL 485710, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 2002) 
(where plaintiff refused to provide exact identification of alleged secrets until “less than two weeks before 
the close of discovery, [it] severely prejudiced [defendant’s] ability to chart a course for discovery and its 
defense in this case.”); Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co., 164 F. Supp. 904, 910 (E.D. Wis. 1958) 
(dismissing case for plaintiff’s failure to obey pre-trial order and identify its alleged secrets; “Nor should 
defendants have to wait until plaintiff puts in its case to see what it has to defend against.”). 
69 See Cargill, Inc. v. Sears Petroleum & Transp. Corp., 388 F. Supp. 2d 37, 65 n.19 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (on 
post-judgment motions, jury misappropriation verdict affirmed and by not previously objecting, defendant 
waived argument that verdict form did not specifically identify alleged secrets).  
70 See Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1266-68 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(reversing judgment based on jury verdict where plaintiff failed to specifically identify alleged secrets; 
noting that specificity was especially important given that defendant held a patent in the technology at 





                                                                                                                                                
but in many others, especially those after a final judgment, courts leave the ruling against 
the defendant in place.71 
¶71 It is worth noting that the defendant’s failure to raise the issue until the last 
minute leads to post-hoc justifications for a faulty judgment or jury verdict, when a 
timely argument might have changed the course of the case.72  Because appellate courts 
tend to uphold jury verdicts, untimely argument can lead to questionable holdings.  In one 
case, a plaintiff apparently failed to identify any specific alleged secrets within its 
software during a long jury trial, but the defendant does not appear to have raised the 
issue until post-trial motions.  The district court affirmed the jury verdict by resorting to 
 
issue); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming judgment for defendant 
where, among other things, plaintiff “consistently failed throughout this litigation to identify any 
particularized trade secrets actually at risk.  Prior to trial, AMP submitted six single-spaced, typewritten 
pages listing by general item and category hundreds of pieces of AMP internal information.  Other courts 
have warned plaintiffs of the risks they run by failing to identify specific trade secrets and instead 
producing long lists of general areas of information which contain unidentified trade secrets.”), superceded 
by statute, 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065 (1988), as recognized in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.2d 1262, 
1268-69 (7th Cir. 1995); SL Montevideo Tech., Inc. v. Eaton Aerospace, L.L.C, No. 03-3302, 2006 WL 
1472860, at *3 (D. Minn. May 26, 2006) (judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff claimed combination 
trade secret in motor design failed to specifically identify alleged secrets and instead gave only high-level 
descriptions; court noted that plaintiff “has not identified the ‘guts’ of the Montevideo motor or how the 
specific component parts of the Montevideo motor are combined in the ‘guts’ to constitute a trade secret 
when taken as a whole.”); MBL (USA) Corp. v. Diekman, 445 N.E.2d 418, 426-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) 
(early case affirming ruling on motion in limine that plaintiff must identify alleged secrets before 
questioning defendant’s witnesses about defendant’s technologies); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled 
Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 897-98 (Minn. 1983) (in early case on appeal after trial, court affirmed 
misappropriation holding for one alleged secret, but reversed on claimed secrets in brushless motor where 
no dimensions or tolerances were identified; to the reader, however, neither alleged secrets appears to have 
been identified in detail). 
71 See Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (losing defendant argued 
on appeal that plaintiff failed to prove specific secrets; to the extent this was an identification argument 
(which is not entirely clear), court held that plaintiff had proved specific secrets, but no discussion of how 
much detail the plaintiff actually provided in the trial court); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 
F.2d 655, 662 (4th Cir. 1993) (refusing to overturn jury verdict despite plaintiff’s failure to identify precise 
secrets, and affirming on questionable ground that entire object code software was secret without 
questioning whether any particular secrets were identified in such code); Static Control Components, Inc. v. 
Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 465, 476-77 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (on post-trial motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, court held that plaintiff’s corporate deposition witness failed to identify alleged secrets, 
and identification was still an open issue about “one week before trial,” but refusing to grant new trial 
because of general misconduct by both sides); Smithkline Beecham Pharms. Co. v. Merck & Co., 766 A.2d 
442, 447-48 (Del. 2000) (affirming trial judgment for plaintiff despite defendant’s argument that plaintiff 
had, early on, given only a broad identification, because a more precise identification was given “following 
discovery”). 
72 See 3M Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusing to overturn jury verdict; allowing 
judgment against defendant based on vague claims that secrets existed somewhere in 500 pages of 
documents; it is unclear if defendant ever raised identification issue before appeal); Forro Precision, Inc. v. 
IBM Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1057 (9th Cir. 1982) (in early case still cited by trade secret plaintiffs seeking 
to avoid identification, appellate court rejected identification argument in cursory language following trial 
court judgment and jury verdict in favor of plaintiff; court’s reasoning was apparently that because 
defendant obtained materials in which plaintiff claimed secrets, identification of precise secrets was 
unnecessary); Forscan Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Tex. App. 1990) (rejecting 
defendant’s post-trial argument that plaintiff went beyond alleged secrets previously identified in 
interrogatory response; defendant waited too long to object);. 
Vol. 5:1] Charles Tait Graves and Brian D. Range 
 
 91
                                                
the all-too-familiar “combination trade secret” evasion, essentially validating the 
plaintiff’s non-identification.73 
IV. PROPOSALS 
¶72 Having reviewed the policy reasons why identification of alleged secrets is a 
crucial question, the mistakes courts all too often make when ruling on identification 
disputes, and the nationwide case law, we are in a position to offer guidelines and 
standards for ruling on identification disputes in trade secret litigation. 
¶73 As a general proposition, we believe that courts should require trade secret 
plaintiffs to identify their alleged secrets in detail as early as possible in the litigation.74  
What follows are proposals tied to the stage of the litigation and the type of information 
claimed as secret, with general guidelines appropriate to all identification disputes.  We 
also propose a model interrogatory requesting a precise identification of the plaintiff’s 
trade secret claims. 
A. General Guidelines 
¶74 Some general considerations are appropriate for all identification disputes.   
 Separating Identification From the Secrecy Analysis:  As described 
above, courts should always treat the identification requirement as 
a separate, threshold question before reaching the distinct issue of 
whether the claimed information actually amounts to a trade secret.  
Identification is not so much a fact issue as a drafting issue. 
 Non-Confidential Identification:  Courts should be wary of plain-
tiffs’ purported identifications that list only general, high-level 
categories or technical terms.  One general rule might be that if the 
list of alleged secrets is not marked as a confidential document or 
could have been listed verbatim in the complaint without actually 
disclosing the plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets, the list is prima facie 
insufficient.  No plaintiff making a good faith identification would 
disclose its alleged secrets in a non-confidential document.75 
 Incomplete Identification:  Another basic consideration is that if an 
identification list expressly includes phrases suggesting that it is 
incomplete – such as “including,” and “among other things” – it 
should likewise be prima facie insufficient.  Some courts have 
 
73 See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumann Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1993) 
(plaintiff gave testimony at trial about its alleged software secrets, but apparently did not actually define 
them with precision). 
74 To this end, courts should assist the parties by expediting review of protective orders that allow the 
plaintiff to identify the alleged secrets in a confidential manner, and by permitting identifications of trade 
secret claims to be filed under seal when it is necessary to refer to such information in a pleading before the 
court.  These practices are routine in jurisdictions where trade secret litigation is common, but other courts 
are not as familiar with them. 
75 For a useful article providing advice for a plaintiff seeking to identify alleged secrets in good faith, see 
Victoria A. Cundiff, How to Identify Your Trade Secrets in Litigation, 574 PLI/Pat 557 (1999). 





                                                
noted the problem of such “catch all” phrases when requiring 
more.76   
 Avoid References to Voluminous Documents:  Courts should not 
allow trade secret plaintiffs to point to documents in which trade 
secrets are said to reside as a substitute for a detailed identification.  
Documents such as design specifications may contain far more in-
formation that what is claimed as trade secrets, and reading a com-
plex document may not inform the reader what precisely is being 
asserted as secret.77  As an example, the Southern District of New 
York once recognized this problem by holding that a mere list of 
documents was an insufficient identification.  The court required 
the plaintiff to identify all trade secrets claims, to list all documents 
referring to such claims, and “to key all documents or portions 
thereof to specific trade secrets and confidential information al-
leged to have been misappropriated” because “[a]t the very least, a 
defendant is entitled to know the bases for plaintiff’s charges 
against it.”78   
 Requiring Identification of Combination Trade Secret Claims:  We 
also believe that courts should require identification of alleged 
“combination trade secrets,” and should not confuse the existence 
of such allegations with whether identification of particular combi-
nations is necessary.  We described above several rulings, mis-
taken in our view, where trade secret plaintiffs asserted “combina-
tion” secrets and avoided having to identify them.  But many other 
courts have correctly held that trade secret plaintiffs must identify 
“combination trade secret” claims just as they must identify indi-
vidual trade secret claims.79  We believe that these decisions reflect 
 
76 See StonCor Group, Inc. v. Campton, No. C05-1225J1R, 2006 WL 314336, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash.  Feb. 7, 
2006) (granting motion to compel; plaintiff used phrase “among other things”); Systems Am., Inc. v. 
Softline, Inc., No. C96-20730 RMW PVT n1, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 
1996) (finding plaintiff’s Cal. Civ. Proc. § 2019.210 statement “insufficient” in part because it employed a 
“catch-all” phrase concerning “relevant business activities”); Struthers Scientific Int’l Corp. v. Gen. Foods 
Corp., 51 F.R.D. 149, 154 (D. Del. 1970) (where plaintiff’s response to defendant’s identification 
interrogatory included a “’catch-all’ provision” claiming additional unspecified combination trade secrets, 
motion to compel more specific answer granted; “Struthers should be required to specifically describe what 
particular combination of components it has in mind, how these components are combined, and how they 
operate in a unique combination.  This matter cannot be left to pure speculation and conjecture.”).  
77 We have seen a case, for example, where the trade secret plaintiff attempted to identify its alleged trade 
secrets by pointing to over one thousand documents and more than forty million lines of source code.  The 
case settled before any ruling on that tactic, but we believe that the practice is not uncommon. 
78 See Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
79 See Staffbridge, Inc. v. Gary D. Nelson Assoc., Inc., No. 024912BLS, 2004 WL 1429935, at *4 (Mass. 
June 11, 2004) (where plaintiff failed to identify alleged secrets in software product “literally on the eve of 
trial,” and where plaintiff’s expert report seeking to make such identification was too vague and 
conclusory, plaintiff ordered to serve a affidavit “that sets forth with rigorous and focused particularity 
what, and only what, the plaintiffs claim to constitute the trade secrets allegedly misappropriated by either 
of the defendants” or face summary judgment); Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 
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the better reasoning, and should be followed by other courts.  One 
such ruling, an early 1958 decision by a federal court in Wiscon-
sin, is worth quoting for the court’s indignation at the plaintiff’s re-
fusal to identify its combination claims of one hundred unspecified 
modifications:  
Just specify the hundred different machines you claim, and dia-
gram them.  Let’s find out what you claim was a trade secret that 
was improperly communicated to and used by the defendant.  If 
there are a hundred, let’s have a hundred, but let’s have it specific 
so when this case comes on for trial, or if the defendant wants to 
take further discovery on those matters they will know what the is-
sues are going to be and the court will know what the issues are 
going to be, and we won’t come in here with a broad shotgun 
charge and be weeks putting in testimony on matters that could be 
handled in very short order.  I think they are entitled to have that 
made very definite.80 
 Keep the Identification Within the Scope of the Complaint:  A fi-
nal general consideration applicable at any stage of the case is that 
a plaintiff should not be permitted to allege trade secrets outside of 
the fact pattern pleaded in the complaint.  While this may be rare, 
we have seen at least one case where a plaintiff alleged a customer 
list-type set of allegations in a complaint against its former sales-
people, but then generally described hardware-based trade secrets 
in its California identification statement.  In an unpublished ruling, 
the court granted the defendants’ motion for an order limiting the 
scope of the trade secret claims after the defense raised the basic 
principle that the alleged secrets were beyond the claims and de-
fenses at issue in the complaint.81 
 
23212863, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2003) (rejecting motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff 
claimed secrets in “unique combination of functions and capabilities” in certain software, “customer 
preferences,” product documentation, and source code; court rejected claims, noting “As for its source 
code, Compuware has for whatever reason failed to identify any specific lines of source code that have 
been taken by IBM.”); Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 699-700 (Minn. 1982) 
(affirming summary judgment where court was “plagued with the elasticity of plaintiff’s claim. Simply to 
assert a trade secret resides in some combination of other known data is not sufficient, as the combination 
itself must be delineated with some particularity in establishing its trade secret status.”; rejecting plaintiff’s 
various efforts at cobbling together an alleged combination trade secret); Struthers Scientific Int’l Corp. v. 
Gen. Foods Corp., 51 F.R.D. 149, 154 (D. Del. 1970) (where plaintiff’s response to defendant’s 
identification interrogatory included a “’catch-all’ provision” claiming additional unspecified combination 
trade secrets, motion to compel more specific answer granted; “Struthers should be required to specifically 
describe what particular combination of components it has in mind, how these components are combined, 
and how they operate in a unique combination.  This matter cannot be left to pure speculation and 
conjecture.”); Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co., 164 F. Supp. 904, 907, 910 (E.D. Wis. 1958) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s effort to avoid identifying alleged secrets by asserting “a hundred different 
modifications” of technology at issue; dismissing case for failure to identify on motion to compel 
compliance with pre-trial order).  
80 See Package Mach. Co., 164 F. Supp. at 910. 
81 See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Verplex Sys., Inc., No. 5:00-CV-20562, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2001) (order 





                                                                                                                                                
B. Type of Information 
¶75 Another important consideration is that the possibilities for identification 
differ according to the type of information being claimed as trade secrets.  Some 
information can only be identified by naming it, such as customer contact information.  
With information in source code, however, there can be more than one plausible way to 
provide a precise identification. 
 Customer Lists and Business Information:  It should be clear 
that in cases involving simpler types of information such as cus-
tomer lists, there are no choices other than defining exactly what 
the alleged secret is or merely listing generic categories.  When a 
plaintiff claims trade secrets in customer list information, pricing 
or sales information, or business or marketing plans, it should be 
easy to tell the defendant exactly what the alleged secrets are – the 
plaintiff can simply name the supposedly secret customers, prices, 
ideas, and the like.82 
 Formulas, Measurements, and Mathematical Information:  As 
complex as chemical formulas, measurements, and math-based cal-
culations can be, they too can be identified only by stating exactly 
what the item is:  the numerical measurements or dimensions, the 
calculation expressed in mathematical terms, and so on.  The same 
precise and detailed nature that can make this type of information 
secret also makes it easy to fully identify.  
 Software Code:  Identification of trade secret claims in software 
code can take many forms.  For example, trade secrets could exist 
as (1) the functionality of compiled and executable object code; (2) 
source code implementing higher level algorithms that may or may 
not be secret; (3) information or formulas within source code; (4) 
algorithms or architecture; or (5) data structure items.83  At the 
same time, software can contain non-secret information in those 
 
granting defendants’ motion for protective order). 
82 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 30, at § 11.23 (noting that with categories like customer lists, “there is no 
middle ground between identifying a customer and not making such an identification”). 
83 One court has stated that “a computer program generally ‘includes source code, which is the developer’s 
tool in creating software, object code, and other technical information, including program architecture, 
design definitions or specifications, flow diagrams and flow charts, data structures, data compilations, 
formulae and algorithms embodied and used in the software.’”  ECT Int’l, Inc. v. Zwerlein, 597 N.W.2d 
479, 483 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming summary judgment in part due to failure to identify trade secrets 
adequately) (quoting Robert C. Scheinfeld & Gary M. Butter, Using Trade Secret Law to Protect Computer 
Software, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 381, 383 (1991) (footnotes omitted)).  We find this 
characterization confusing.  Source code is the human readable version of the instructions the computer 
will carry out.  A computer program called a “compiler” transforms source code into executable object 
code that the computer may read directly.  The “other technical information” referenced in the article could 
be characterized as either specific formulas embodied by and readable within a few lines of source code or 
overall high-level plans for what the program should accomplish and how it will accomplish it through 
certain algorithms and structure. 
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same categories, as well as auto-generated code, open source mate-
rial, or basic code mandated by the programming language or type 
of program.  Identification of each of these categories is thus wor-
thy of independent consideration. 
¶76 In the rare case where a trade secret plaintiff alleges that executable object 
code was misappropriated, the plaintiff should name the executable files, and identify 
what about their functionality is alleged to be secret.84  Second, where the plaintiff alleges 
misappropriation of source code, it should identify the specific lines of code or programs 
claimed to be secret by, for example, printing out the code on paper with numbered lines 
and identifying the allegedly misappropriated lines by page and line number, by 
highlighting, or by color-coding.85  Third, algorithms or formulas existing within code 
should be identified with exactitude just like mathematical information.  Fourth, in the 
case of algorithms, the plaintiff should identify the precise combination of functions 
which comprise the algorithms at issue.  Similarly, the higher-level architecture of the 
software should be identified by detailing the combination of the specific algorithms 
employed.  Fifth, where secret data structures are alleged, the nature of those structures 
should be defined with particularity.86 
 
84 Trade secret cases about executable software are rare because the final, executable software product is 
often the version sold to the public, while the underlying source code remains secret.  Such a case could 
arise if, for example, the plaintiff maintains executable object code as a tool used secretly for internal 
purposes rather than selling it and then accuses the defendant of taking it.  Identifying the functionality 
provided by object code seems necessary to establish that the object code has economic value and differs 
from other, publicly-available executable files.  After all, object code is not source code, and 
misappropriating an object code file would not be misappropriation of the source code used to make that 
file.  A plaintiff could not accurately identify alleged secrets in object code by describing the source code 
used to create it.  Indeed, in a different trade secret litigation context – that of reasonable measures used to 
protect the alleged secret, rather than identification of the alleged secret – courts have consistently held that 
there is a valid distinction between object code and source code, and that revealing object code does not 
disclose alleged secrets in source code.  See generally Fabkom, Inc. v. R.W. Smith & Assoc., Inc., No. 95 
Civ. 4552 (MBM), 1996 WL 531873, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1996) (same; software “distributed to its 
customers only in its executable object code form. . . .  This means that any person attempted to reveal the 
programming instructions would see an incomprehensible sequence of numbers . . . .”); ISC-Bunker Ramo 
Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (plaintiff’s “computer programs are only 
distributed in object code, which is not intelligible to human beings.”); Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 
F. Supp. 608, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“Only the object code is publicly available; this is the version of the 
program that is intended to be read by the computer and cannot be understood even by expert 
programmers.”) (citing Glenn J. MacGrady, Protection of Computer Software—an Update and Practical 
Synthesis, 20 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1063 (1983) (“Secrecy will not be destroyed by the wide distribution of 
computer programs if they are distributed in object form only.”)).Barr-Mullin, Inc. v. Browning, 424 
S.E.2d 226, 229 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (plaintiff used reasonable measures to protect source code, and sold 
only object code software made from that source code to the public).  Thus, identification of alleged secrets 
provided by object code differs from identifying trade secret claims in source code, and the two should not 
be confused. 
85 See Compuware Corp. v. IBM, No. 02-CV-70906, 2003 WL 23212863, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 
2003) (rejecting motion for preliminary injunction where plaintiff claimed secrets in “unique combination 
of functions and capabilities” in certain software, “customer preferences,” product documentation, and 
source code; court denied preliminary injunction, noting: “As for its source code, Compuware has for 
whatever reason failed to identify any specific lines of source code that have been taken by IBM.”). 
86 Databases can contain specific content and combinations of content in fields.  A plaintiff may believe 
that such data constitutes trade secrets and, if so, that information should be identified. 





                                                
 Mechanical Devices:  Trade secrets might be embodied in me-
chanical devices that include secret parts unknown to the public or 
a secret combination of publicly known parts.87  A plaintiff alleg-
ing trade secret claims about a secret part should identify that part 
in detail.  If the plaintiff alleges that the trade secret is a combina-
tion of publicly known parts, the plaintiff should identify that 
combination, and the court should limit the plaintiff’s ability to 
modify the alleged combination.88 
 Chemical Mixtures and Recipes:  Mixtures, whether for some-
thing as simple as some food product recipes or the combination of 
ingredients in a certain brand of gasoline, should be identified by 
the combination of publicly known elements – including the meas-
urements or ratios for each ingredient. 
 Negative Information:  Negative information – sometimes called 
“what not to do” – can pose difficulties.  One prominent commen-
tator believes that because the total invention history of a combina-
tion-type trade secret can contain a body of negative knowledge in 
the sense of many steps not taken and choices not made, identify-
ing that sum total should not be required.89  We agree in part.  It is 
unlikely that the defendant will be accused of actually taking and 
using that whole panoply of negative items, and thus there is no 
need to force the plaintiff to draft a complete invention history.  
However, where a plaintiff specifically accuses a defendant of tak-
ing and using one or more items of negative information, we see 
no policy reason not to require that those items also be defined in 
detail. 
 Destroyed Information:  Perhaps the hardest question involves an 
extreme scenario where a defendant physically destroys informa-
tion that was valuable and secret, without leaving any copies be-
hind.  We know of no cases on this subject, and have never seen it 
in practice.  A deserving plaintiff may have no ability to precisely 
identify what was destroyed, but a malicious plaintiff could claim 
purported value in information that never really existed, or that 
was of little actual value.  This is an area where courts should have 
wide discretion to assess the facts of particular cases.  For exam-
ple, if it were impossible for plaintiff to identify the destroyed se-
cret, a court could require identification of the circumstances of the 
 
87 In the case of computer hardware, “parts” could include source code – either firmware or software – 
integrated with physical hardware. 
88 See infra Section III(E). 
89 See POOLEY, supra note 4, at § 11.02 (“[T]he nature of a secret process, with its underlying platform of 
accumulated negative data, is such that it cannot practically be restated in exhaustive detail.”). 
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alleged creation, destruction, and plaintiff’s ownership in the in-
formation. 
C. Stage of the Case 
¶77 As discussed above, a court’s handling of the identification dispute differs 
depending on the stage of the case.  We believe that the pleading stage is not the time to 
consider identification questions, except in cases where the complaint fails the ordinary 
rules for indefinite statements.90 
¶78 However, we believe that when a trade secret plaintiff requests preliminary 
injunctive relief that could seriously impact the defendant – by shutting its business, 
limiting a person’s employment options, scaring away investors and customers, and the 
like – courts should require an identification of the alleged trade secrets at issue with a 
substantial degree of detail.  There might be exceptions for highly unusual circumstances 
– where, hypothetically, there is concrete evidence that the defendant is planning an 
imminent foreign transfer of an immense amount of stolen software code, and there is no 
time to provide all the details.  Courts are capable of separating such extreme facts from 
routine motions against departing employees who have just started a new company.   
¶79 Most important, we believe that courts in jurisdictions that have not yet 
enacted a pre-discovery identification requirement for trade secret cases should do so, 
both as a valuable case management process and to encourage pre-lawsuit investigations.  
In addition to the trade secret pre-discovery cases described above, the approach several 
federal courts have taken in patent cases provides a useful analogy.  Federal district 
courts in California, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Texas have enacted special local rules 
for patent cases that require a more specific identification of the patent claims than 
already exist in the published patent.  Specifically, these districts require patentees to 
explain with precision at a very early stage exactly what patent claims are being asserted 
and why the allegedly infringing product or process satisfies each element of the asserted 
patent claims.91  As one court explained, the patent local rules were adopted to “place the 
parties on an orderly pretrial track,” “require the plaintiff to carefully prepare for the 
filing of a patent suit,” and “require parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in 
the litigation and to adhere to these theories once they have been disclosed.”92   
¶80 The benefit of identification in the trade secret context is even greater.  In a 
patent case, the court and the defendant have notice of the patent’s claims and have a 
description of the invention from the published patent itself.  The local rules described 
above go a step further by removing any mystery about what particular claims the 
plaintiff will assert and how the plaintiff intends to argue that those claims cover an 
accused product or process.  In a trade secret case, and absent an identification 
requirement, the court and the defendant cannot know how the plaintiff will allege that 
trade secrets were misappropriated, and, even worse, cannot know what the trade secret 
claims are.  The need for identification in trade secret cases is thus more critical than in 
 
90 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10(f) (permitting a demurrer to an “ambiguous and unintelligible” 
pleading); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (permitting a motion for a more definite statement).   
91 See N.D. Cal. Patent. L.R. 3-1; N.D. Ga. Patent L.R. 4.1; W.D. Penn. LPR. 3.2; E.D. Tex. P.R. 3-1. 
92 See Integrated Circuit Sys., Inc. v. Realtek Semiconductor Co., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 





                                                
patent cases.  Enacting local rules akin to these patent-based rules would be a worthy goal 
for trade secret law.  In any event, courts can require pre-discovery identification by 
common law for case management purposes.   
¶81 Finally, detailed identification should always be required by the summary 
judgment stage, assuming that discovery has taken place.  But where a defendant fails to 
raise the identification issue until after trial, it is understandable why so many courts have 
refused to reverse on that basis. 
D. Defendant’s Discovery Request 
¶82 As discussed above, the defense sometimes compounds the identification 
problem by serving badly-phrased discovery requests or, more importantly, failing to 
timely raise the issue.  By failing to ask for a totally precise identification, a defendant 
can allow the plaintiff to get by with generic concepts and categories, and alter its claims 
without judicial review. 
¶83 In one case, for example, the defendant’s interrogatory apparently requested 
only that plaintiff describe the alleged secrets and documents in which they were 
contained.  When the plaintiff responded with a generalized statement pointing to 17 
pages and describing a “manufacturing process” “including” seven general concepts, the 
defendant moved to compel.  But the court found the generalized identification 
sufficient.93  Perhaps if the defendant had served a better-worded interrogatory 
demanding precision, the result would have been different. 
¶84 Likewise, a defendant in a California case made a mistake when it tied its 
identification interrogatory to California’s pre-discovery statute – which does not require 
absolute precision – instead of asking for complete precision.94  Yet another defendant 
asked only for the identification of documents in which the plaintiff’s alleged secrets 
were to be found, instead of asking for a precise identification of the claims themselves.95  
It therefore failed to seek the maximum degree of detail it could have requested.  
Similarly, a failure to press for complete identification in deposition questioning can 
allow the plaintiff latitude to alter its claims afterwards.96 
¶85 We believe that a well-worded interrogatory or other discovery request 
should demand a totally precise, complete identification of each alleged trade secret.  A 
model interrogatory with an accompanying definition is as follows: 
 
93 See Norbrook Labs., Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Mfg. Co., No. 5:03CV165(HGH/GLS), 2003 WL 1956214, at 
*2-4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003). 
94 See Synapsis, L.L.C v. Evergreen Data Sys., Inc., No. C 05-1524 JF, 2006 WL 2053512, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
July 21, 2006) (granting motion to compel where plaintiff refused to respond). 
95 See Multimedia Cablevision, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Co-op, Inc., No. 94-1130-MLB, 1996 WL 447815, at *1-2 
(D. Kan. July 30, 1996) (Defendant’s interrogatory which only asked plaintiff to identify the documents 
which comprised the basis for the trade secret claim; nonetheless, court granted motion to compel a better 
answer regarding the documents in question and issued sanctions against plaintiff.). 
96 See Cacique, Inc. v. V&V Supremo Foods, Inc., No. 03 C 4230, 2004 WL 2222270, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
30, 2004) (denying motion to strike portions of declaration submitted by plaintiff in opposition to motion 
for summary judgment; although defendant argued that declaration added additional trade secret claims not 
previously identified, court noted that defendant failed to “ask any follow-up questions” at deposition 
regarding area in which alleged secrets were claimed). 
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¶86 Identify with precision and specificity each and every alleged trade secret 
[Plaintiff] contends [Defendant] misappropriated.  “Identify with precision and specificity 
each and every alleged trade secret” as used herein means to provide a specific 
description of each such alleged trade secret, on an individual basis for each such alleged 
trade secret, in such a manner that the exact identity, scope, boundaries, constitutive 
elements, and content of each such alleged trade secret are fully disclosed in writing, 
including any asserted combinations, [and with precision above that required by 
California Code of Civil Procedure section 2019.210].  Plaintiff should not rely on any 
vague or conclusory phrases that do not separately list and describe each such alleged 
trade secret. 
¶87 This model request requires a totally precise identification of each alleged 
secret, without dissembling or deliberate obfuscation.  It alerts the reader to typical 
evasion practices, and thus educates a court ruling on a motion to compel about what 
exactly is sought and what is insufficient.  The request also makes clear that more is 
sought than what some jurisdictions require at the pre-discovery stage – California law in 
this model – though of course the request can be adapted to different jurisdictions. 
E. Amendment 
¶88 The question sometimes arises whether a trade secret plaintiff can unilaterally 
amend its identification of trade secret claims as the case proceeds.  One can envision 
circumstances where amendment would be proper, such as where a plaintiff learns that a 
defendant has misappropriated trade secrets beyond those first believed to be at issue.  
But one can also envision circumstances where the plaintiff drops one set of meritless 
claims in order to pursue another, alters claims to avoid summary judgment or to add in 
new claims just before trial, or changes definitions of existing claims to confound the 
defendant’s ability to research the public domain.   
¶89 A 2004 federal court case applying California law created a rule that we 
believe makes sense and should be widely adopted.  The court held that because a 
statement identifying the plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets is akin to a pleading, the plaintiff 
would have to show good cause to amend the statement, just as it would have to do in 
order to amend its complaint.97  Subjecting amendments and alterations to judicial review 
would help prevent the problems we have experienced in many cases where the alleged 
secrets change repeatedly as the case proceeds, often as the close of discovery nears. 
¶90 Another good practice is to prevent the plaintiff from amending its 
identification of alleged secrets in order to avoid a defendant’s pending summary 
judgment motion.98  The same practice should apply if the plaintiff claims a “combination 
 
97 See Neothermia Corp. v. Rubicor Med., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  This rule is 
intended to prevent the “shifting sands” problem in intellectual property cases where a plaintiff changes its 
claims around as the case proceeds.  See id. (noting the problem to be “a concern which applies with equal 
force to trade secret allegations.”).  See also Vacco Indus., Inc. v. Van Den Berg, 5 Cal. App. 4th 34, 51 
n.16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (prior case under California law finding “no error” in fact that plaintiff amended 
statement identification statement “several times,” but providing no information as to whether trial court 
oversaw such amendments). 
98 See Pixion, Inc. v. Placeware, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1242 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (although court’s 
incorrect view of what level of specificity is required under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 2019.210 is clear under the 
subsequent California state court ruling in Advanced Modular Sputtering, supra note 40, court refused to 
allow plaintiff to avoid summary judgment motion by going beyond identification previously stated to be 





                                                                                                                                                
trade secret” and tries to alter its sub-elements in the face of a summary judgment 
motion.99 While this might be inappropriate where discovery has only just begun and the 
motion is filed too early, we believe that courts would promote and invite litigation 
abuses if they allowed trade secret plaintiffs to alter the claims and escape a motion for 
summary judgment filed after significant discovery has taken place. 
¶91 In turn, some courts have refused to allow amendment and addition of new 
trade secret claims after discovery closes, and that too should be a universal rule.100 
F. Sanctions 
¶92 Courts have issued sanctions in several trade secret cases where plaintiffs 
failed to identify their alleged secrets despite defense efforts to obtain more 
information.101  Others have declined to award sanctions even where the failure to 
identify (among other problems) was manifest.102  Rule 11 and similar state rules already 
 
complete by claiming new details of functionality as trade secrets; court instead ruled on claims as 
previously asserted in identification statement). 
99 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 F.3d 108 (8th Cir. 1997).  In American 
Airlines, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling against the trade secret 
plaintiff, American Airlines.  The plaintiff’s expert testified that its combination trade secret consisted of 
five elements and implementation algorithms.  Id. at 110.  After discovering that the defendant had not 
acquired all five elements, the plaintiff attempted, through expert testimony, to claim that the other four 
elements constituted a valid combination trade secret.  Id.  The court, rejected this “sham” definition of the 
combination trade secret and upheld the district court’s summary judgment based on the original definition 
of the combination trade secret that included all five elements of the plaintiff’s system.  Id. at 111-12.  The 
court concluded “After careful examination of American's expert's testimony we agree with the district 
court's conclusion that American attempted to manufacture a material issue of fact just to evade the impact 
of summary judgment by inexplicably changing its testimony. Thus, the district court correctly disregarded 
the subsequent manufactured contradictory testimony of American and concluded that no factual issue for 
trial existed for the reason that KLM never received any trade secret of American's.”). 
100 See Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. Forest Flavors Int’l, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 760, 770 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) 
(prohibiting plaintiff from submitting 36 new trade secret claims after discovery closed; prior interrogatory 
response had identified 31 other alleged secrets); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev Indus., Inc., No. 84 C 
6740, 1992 WL 162241, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 1992) (excluding allegedly secret drawings raised after 
discovery closed). 
101 See Compuware Corp. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., No. 01 C 0873, 2002 WL 485710, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 1, 2002) (the court issued sanctions where defendant won motion to compel regarding interrogatory 
requesting identification of alleged secrets but plaintiff “dragged its feet” in responding and merely listed 
functions of allegedly secret software); Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Group, Inc., No. 98-CV-0312 TW 
(CGA), 1999 WL 33178020, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1999) (awarding defendant attorneys’ fees for many 
reasons, including plaintiff’s claims of “trade secret protection over several vague classes of unprotectable 
information”); Multimedia Cablevision, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Co-op, Inc., No. 94-1130-MLB, 1996 WL 
447815, at *1-2 (D. Kan. July 30, 1996) (sanctions issued against plaintiff where defendant’s motion to 
compel better interrogatory answer on documents containing alleged secrets granted); Diversified Tech., 
Inc. v. Dubin, 156 F.R.D. 132 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (depublished) (issue preclusion sanctions for plaintiff’s 
repeated refusal to identify alleged secrets; “With trial of this matter set for less than a week from today, 
the prejudice to defendants is immeasurable.”); Automated Packaging Sys., Inc. v. Sharp Packaging, Inc., 
No. 88-C-0656, 1989 WL 223755, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 17, 1989) (fees awarded for meritless request for 
preliminary injunction where “[t]he plaintiff’s case fails because of its inability to establish any sort of 
identifiable trade secret which could lend itself to an injunctive proceeding.”); Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 
344 F. Supp. 924, 927 (M.D. Penn. 1972) (awarding discovery sanctions where defendant moved to compel 
over inadequate interrogatory responses on identification of alleged secrets). 
102 See Clearwater Sys. Corp. v. Evapco, Inc., No. Civ.A 305CV507SRU, 2006 WL 726684, at *2 (D. 
Conn. Mar. 20, 2006) (refusing to award UTSA attorneys’ fees despite baseless lawsuit; “Clearwater’s 
ineffective identification of the trade secrets pursued in this case left much to be desired and doubtless 
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require that a plaintiff understand precisely the alleged secrets that it accuses the 
defendant of misappropriating, and there is no reason the plaintiff should be unable to 
share this understanding – essential to the plaintiff’s core case—with the defendant.  
Because non-identification is a lawyers’ tactic used to gain an unfair litigation advantage, 
we believe that sanctions should be readily awarded where a trade secret plaintiff tries to 
supply as little information as possible and hopes that the court will not require more. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶93 Disputes regarding identification of alleged trade secrets are common in trade 
secret litigation around the country.  Courts thus far have not articulated a uniform set of 
standards and guidelines to address the problem.  But such rules are needed, because 
trade secret plaintiffs generally refuse to precisely identify their trade secret claims unless 
the court forces them to do so.  Our proposals would ensure that the many policy grounds 
supporting a precise identification of alleged secrets would be satisfied in any given case. 
 
increased EVAPCO’s costs in defending the litigation.  Still, I am not convinced that Clearwater’s 
problems with trade secret identification reflect a calculated strategy to gain an advantage in the litigation 
or to unfairly compete with EVAPCO.”). 
